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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the exterritorial application of the antitrust laws of the United States
and the European Union ("EU"), some mergers might be reviewed by both
jurisdictions. The European Merger Regulation is applied extraterritorially when
the merger is above a certain threshold.' Similar to Europe, the United States
applies its competition laws to foreign companies based on the "effects test" as
established in U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America. Not only is it possible, but it is
becoming more common that the same merger is reviewed under both systems.
The dual system of review is demonstrated in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas,3
General Electric ("GE")/Honeywell,4 Sandoz/Ciba-Geigy,5  Guinness/Grand
Met,6 Exxon/Mobil and many more.'
The two jurisdictions usually reach similar conclusions because there is
increasing substantive convergence in the application of merger rules. But it is
not unheard of for the two jurisdictions to reach different conclusions, as in the
latest merger case GE/Honeywell.9 The question is whether the different
outcomes are due to different effects of the merger on different markets, or
whether they are due to differences in the approach and analysis. While overall
the merger analysis is similar and there has been convergence in the area, there
has also been a significant level of divergence between the two jurisdictions.
The purpose of this paper is to point out some of the areas of divergence. For
example, the EU focuses on the merger's effect on competitors, while the United
States focuses on consumers or prices; the EU focuses more on single firm
dominance and monopolies, but the United States focuses on collective
dominance, collusion, and differences in conglomerate effects; and lastly there
are differences in efficiency considerations. This analysis will compare two
important merger cases, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell, which
were reviewed in both jurisdictions and resulted in different outcomes. This
article and the comparative case analysis will show that the EU uses a broader
1. See Wood Pulp case 1988 ECR 5193, 4 CMLR 901 3 (1988) (holding that where two-thirds of the
product in question is affected by concentration, the effect is deemed substantial enough to establish
jurisdiction).
2. 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
3. M 877 (1997), Boeing/McDonnell Douglas.
4. M 2220 (2001), GE (General Electric) /Honeywell.
5. M 737 (1996), Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz.
6. M 938 (1997), Guinness/Grand Metropolitan.
7. M 1383 (1999), Exxon/Mobil.
8. See Janet L. McDavid, Globalization of Premerger Notification and Review: Practical Problems and
Solutions in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 35 (Corporate Law Institute 1999) (explaining that
multiple investigations of transactions involving U.S. and foreign firms, or just foreign firms are common, see
e.g.: BP/Amoco/Arco, BT/AT&T, BP/Amoco, Daimler/Chrysler, American Airlines/British Airways, BT/MCI,
Sprint/France Telecom/Deutsche Telekom, Shell/Montedison, Metal Leve/Mahle, Grand Met/Guiness, Federal
Mogul/T&N, Exxon/Mobil, WorldCom/MCI, Sandoz/Ciba Geigy and many others).
9. See GE/Honeywell, supra note 4.
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analysis than the United States. In addition, the EU is more concerned with
competitors and the conglomerate effects of the merger.
II. BOEING/MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
The first case, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, involved a merger between
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, two U.S. corporations. The merger was
reviewed in both jurisdictions. The United States approved the merger without
any conditions, while the EU approved the deal only after the parties accepted
some important concessions.
Boeing is a U.S. corporation whose shares are publicly traded. Boeing
operates in the commercial aircraft, defense and space market. "Commercial
aircraft operations involve the development, production and marketing of
commercial jet aircraft, and providing related support services to the commercial
airline industry worldwide. Defense and space operations include research,
development, production, modification and support of military aircraft and
helicopter and related systems, space and missile systems, rocket engines, and
information services."' Boeing acquired Rockwell International's defense and
space unit prior to its merger with McDonnell Douglas.
McDonnell Douglas is also a U.S. corporation whose shares are publicly
traded. According to the EU Commission, McDonnell Douglas was the world's
leading manufacturer of military aircraft. McDonnell Douglas operated in the
military aircraft, missiles, space and electronic systems, commercial aircraft, and
financial systems markets. Its operations in military aircraft and missiles
involved the design, development, production and support of the following
products: military transport aircraft; combat aircraft and training systems;
commercial and military helicopters and ordinance; missiles; satellites; launching
vehicles and space station components and systems; lasers and sensors; and
command, control, communications, and intelligence systems. In the commercial
jet aircraft area," McDonnell Douglas designed, developed, produced, modified
and sold commercial jet aircraft and related spare parts. McDonnell Douglas also
engaged in aircraft financing, commercial equipment leasing and the commercial
real estate market for itself and other commercial customers.'
2 In sum, both of the
corporations were involved in commercial and military aircrafts. However,
McDonnell Douglas was no longer a meaningful competitor in the commercial
aircraft market.
McDonnell Douglas' decline in the commercial aircraft industry was a main
point of divergence between the United States and EU's analysis of the proposed
merger. The United States focused on McDonnell Douglas' inability to compete
10. Case IV/M 877, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Commission Decision 97/816, 1997 OJ (L 336) 16,
[hereinafter Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU)] 3.
11. Douglas Aircraft Company ("DAC") is the commercial aircraft business of McDonnell Douglas.
12. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, 4.
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in commercial large aircraft and its affect on prices. The EU Commission also
accepted that McDonnell Douglas was no longer a real force in the commercial
aircraft market.13 However, the EU differed from the Federal Trade
Commission's ("FTC") approach because it analyzed the possible effects of
McDonnell Douglas' commercial aircraft business after integrating with
Boeing's commercial aircraft business.14 The EU Commission analyzed the
effects of the increase in overall resources, customer base,'5 market shares,' 6
capacity in commercial aircraft and skilled work force, and the ability to induce
airlines to enter into more exclusive dealing agreements. Also, Boeing's
acquisition of McDonnell Douglas' spare parts and maintenance business would
give Boeing additional leverage over the existing McDonnell Douglas aircraft
users, who operate twenty-four percent of the total aircraft fleet worldwide. 7
Although both of the companies dealt in commercial and military aircraft,
both the EU and the United States considered the world market to be the market
for large commercial aircraft. However the FTC did not clearly identify the
proper geographic market in its decision. At the request of the U.S. government,
the EU Commission declined to investigate potential anticompetitive effects in
the military-defense side. However, it did analyze the spillover effects. The EU
Commission limited the scope of its review to the civil side of the operation, but
its analysis focused on the link between McDonnell's civil and defense divisions,
the effect of military capacity on Boeing's civil aircraft division, and the overall
effects resulting from the defense and space business of Douglas.
In the large commercial aircraft market there were three competitors on the
worldwide market: Boeing, Airbus and McDonnell Douglas. After the merger,
only two would remain. Although this was an important fact in the EU analysis,
the United States analysis did not look at the competitors. Instead, its analysis
focused on the ineffectiveness of McDonnell Douglas as a competitor.
In the large commercial aircraft market, there is one important factor to
consider: Boeing had recently entered into exclusive arrangements for the supply
of large commercial aircraft to American Airlines, Delta and Continental
Airlines. For example, American and Boeing agreed to a long-term partnership
that would make Boeing the exclusive supplier of jet aircraft to American until
the year 2018; Delta for 20 years; and Continental also agreed in principle to
thirty five firm orders and further purchase options from Boeing with an
exclusivity requirement for twenty years." According to the EU Commission's
decision, it is estimated that 14,400 new aircraft will be delivered worldwide
13. Id. 57-59.
14. Id. 60 (finding it is not doing well, but can be a significant factor in the market when integrated
with Boeing. Further, Boeing might change its reputation or phase out DAC and have its customer base).
15. From 60% to 84% of the current fleet in service. Id. at 62.
16. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, T 54 (ranging from 64% to 70%).
17. Id. 64.
18. Id. 43.
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between 1997 and 2016, of which 2400 are on firm order with Boeing,
McDonnell Douglas or Airbus. Of the remaining 12,000 aircraft, Boeing's
exclusive deals, including options and purchase rights, account for thirteen
percent of this open market. This number constitutes over thirty percent of the
U.S. market. The exclusive dealing agreements might have anticompetitive,
unilateral effects, which made them problematic in the EU. In the United States,
while the FTC did find the exclusive dealings troubling, it was because of issues
unrelated to the merger. Thus, the FTC decided merely to monitor these
agreements. However, in the EU, one of the concessions that the parties agreed to
was abandoning these exclusive dealing agreements. The reasons underlying
each jurisdiction's decision will be examined in turn.
A. The United States
In the United States, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas announced their
proposed merger on December 15, 1996. In the media, the merger was seen as
creating a better balance between defense and commercial aircrafts, which are
complementary product lines. It was also viewed as a means of increasing
Boeing's ability to use McDonnell Douglas' capacity to help meet its current
order backlog and new demand for commercial aircraft.'
9 According to Harry
Stonecipher, president of McDonnell Douglas, the transaction combines a
focused, broad-based aerospace company with extraordinary capabilities in
commercial and military aircraft, defense and space systems.
20 And, according to
Phil Condit, president of the Boeing Company, the merger would be great for the
airline industry, for the nation's defense program and for the space program
worldwide.2' According to Boeing's lawyers, the rationale from the beginning
was that this was a defense merger and not a transaction for commercial
purposes. Thus, Boeing was not interested in the merger for McDonnell Douglas'
commercial aircraft, but rather it made sense from a defense standpoint.
22 Since
McDonnell Douglas contained both defense and commercial aircraft programs,
the merger included both. As discussed below, these reasons provided the basis
for the EU Commission's concerns.
19. Eric J Stock, Explaining the differing U.S. and EU positions on the Boeing/McDonnellDouglas
Merger: Avoiding Another Near-Miss, 20 U PA J. INT'L ECON L. 825, 839 (1999).
20. Press Release, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas to Merge with Boeing, combination to be the
World's Largest Aerospace Company (Dec. 15, 1996), available at http://www.boeing.com/news/releases
/1996/news.release.961215.html (01/01/2002) (copy on file with the Transnational Lawyer) (last visited Apr. 6,
2004).
21. Id.
22. Interview with Thomas L Boeder & Benjamin S Sharp Attorneys for Boeing, 12 Antitrust 5, 8 (Fall
1997) [hereinafter Boeder & Sharp Interview].
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According to its report, the FTC accepted that on its face, the merger created
concerns based on high market shares and extremely high barriers to entry.23 The
market share for Boeing was roughly sixty percent in large commercial aircraft.
McDonnell Douglas' share was less than five percent, although the FTC did not
provide a market share in the public statements. The HHI increase would be a
total of 480 from 4912 to 5392.
The United States looked at commercial large aircrafts and the FTC decided
not to challenge the deal.24 Although on its face there were concerns, the United
States found that the merger would not reduce competition or tend to create a
monopoly either in the defense or commercial aircraft markets. The merger was
not challenged because McDonnell Douglas was no longer a meaningful
competitor in the commercial aircraft market. McDonnell Douglas' product line
was limited and the products did not have common features with the other
products and were not interchangeable. The United States focus was on
McDonnell Douglas' inability to compete in commercial large aircraft and its
effect on prices. According to the FTC Report, the decision not to challenge the
proposed merger was not based on a failing company defense."
26The United States applied the General Dynamics criteria in the Boeing case.
Under the General Dynamics doctrine, McDonnell Douglas should be seen as
having overstated the importance of its market share to competition, since,
McDonnell Douglas no longer constituted a meaningful competitive force in the
commercial aircraft market.27
23. Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioner Janet D. Steiger, Roscoe B. Srarck III and Christine A.
Varney (July 1, 1997) 5 Trade Regulation Reporter (CCH) 24,295.
24. See id. (approving the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger) [hereinafter Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (US)].
25. See id. (saying that "... . failing company defense comes into play only when Commission first finds
that the transaction is likely to be anticompetitive, but McDonnell Douglas is no longer an effective
competitor").
26. Thomas E. Kauper, Merger Control in the U.S. and the EU: Some Observations, 74 ST JOHN'S L.
REV. 305, 325 (2000); Eric J Stock, supra note 19, at 855; General Dynamics 415 U.S. 486 (discussing the
merger between General Dynamics and United Electric Coal Company). The high market shares were enough
to establish a prima-facie case of illegality under the Philadelphia Bank rule in the absence of other
considerations. The District Court considered other factors and found the merger not likely to lessen
competition thus rebutting the presumption of illegality. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision focusing on
the likely effect of the merger. Id. There were fundamental changes in the market structure for coal. First
according to the District Court, coal producers were declining, but not because of small producers being
acquired, but as the inevitable result of change in the nature of demand for coal. Coal was also becoming less
able to compete with other sources of energy. Also coal was sold under long-term contracts thus committing
reserves. Hence, such coal was not available for spot purchase on the open market. Although other factors were
considered the concluding factor was that United Electric had no available coal to sell because everything was
committed in long- term contracts. United Electric was a less significant factor in the coal market, its potential
to compete with other coal producers in the future was weak, and thus the merger would not lessen competition
and would have any adverse effects. In this case the Court looked beyond the share and concentration numbers
in assessing a merger's likely competitive effects, market shares might be misleading of the effects of the
merger. Id.
27. Stock, supra note 19, at 856.
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Thus, the United States analysis is narrower than to the EU approach. The
United States focused on the likely price effects in the future and did not look at
competitors such as Airbus or exclusive dealing agreements. In the United States,
these agreements did not raise many concerns. Although they were found to be
potentially troubling, the United States regarded them as independent of the
merger and focused narrowly on the effect that the merger would have on
competition and future prices.28 The FTC decided that it intended to monitor the
potential anticompetitive effects of these or any future, long-term exclusive
contracts.29 Commissioner Mary Azcuenaga stated that it was unnecessary to
consider whether the contracts were anticompetitive or not.3 ° According to
Commissioner Azcuenaga, the exclusive dealing agreements accounted for
eleven percent of the market, and this was well below any level of concern to the
Commission." Additionally, the FTC did not look at McDonnell Douglas'
commercial side in the hands of Boeing, which Commissioner Azcuenaga even
criticized. According to her, the merger would combine two of the three
remaining manufacturers of commercial aircraft in the world, and would
eliminate one-third of the firms in a highly concentrated market where entry is
unlikely and difficult. Although McDonnell Douglas had a small share, it did not
mean that it exercised no competitive constraint. For example, in 1996, four
percent of total narrow body-wide body orders in the commercial aircraft
industry were McDonnell Douglas'. This is why she argued that the Commission
had to look at this more closely. Also, the FTC did not analyze the unilateral
effects of Boeing acquiring McDonnell Douglas' maintenance and repair
business for the existing McDonnell Douglas aircrafts. Lastly, the FTC did not
find any concerns with the combination of Boeing with McDonnell Douglas'
military side, which is contrary to the concern expressed by the EU. The FTC did
not analyze the spillover effects of McDonnell Douglas' military side's
combining with Boeing.
In the United States, the Department of Defense ("DOD") also evaluated the
merger. According to the Defense Department's letter of July 1, 1997, the DOD
accepted the deal. Competition would remain in the defense industry post
merger, and the merger did not threaten competition in military programs. The
DOD looked at the programs in which the companies competed or expected to
28. According to the lawyers of Boeing the reason why the FTC looked at exclusive deal agreement was
because the issue was raised in the EU and in their consultations with EU, otherwise nothing to do with the
merger. Sharp, Interview with Thomas L Boeder and Benjamin S. Sharp Attorneys for Boeing, supra note 22, at
7. The EU looked at them although they were not in the scope and they had other ways to challenge them
because they felt like they had a hammer because of the merger review and they exercised it. [Boeder, p. 8].
29. Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioner Janet D. Steiger, Roscoe B. Srarck Il &
Christine A. Varney, (July 1, 1997) Trade Regulation Reporter (CCH), 24, 295.
30. Statement of Commissioner Mary Azcuenega's statement in the Boeing Co., File No. 971-0051,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/07/ma.htm.
31. Stock, supra note 19, at 853-855 (indicating that this is below 20%-30% SC precedent and agency
practice).
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compete (fighter aircraft and expandable launch vehicles), or markets in which it
was likely to be defense suppliers, and determined that the transaction would not
create excessive market concentration. According to the DOD, there were no
current or future fighter aircraft procurement by the DOD in which the two firms
were likely to compete. Also, there were no other domestic military markets in
which products offered by the companies are substitutes for each other. The
DOD saw significant cost savings from consolidation as well as the reduction of
overhead costs. According to the lawyers for Boeing there was also an
expectation that Boeing would apply commercial manufacturing technology and
cost saving efficiencies to DOD defense business.32 However, the FTC decision
does not reflect this argument. Additionally, the FTC, unlike the EU
Commission, failed to consider the effect to McDonnell Douglas' defense side
after integrating with Boeing's commercial aircraft side.
In sum, according to the FTC, the merger would not reduce competition
either in defense or commercial aircraft. It is interesting that the FTC did not
consider the military-side effects although this merger was seen as a defense
merger in the media and also by Boeing's lawyers.
1. The European Union
The analysis completed in the EU was substantially different from that in the
United States, although the market was defined the same in both instances: the
market for large commercial jet aircraft is the world market. Pursuant to the
agreement between the United States and the EU, the U.S. DOD and the
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), on behalf of the U.S. Government, informed the
EU Commission of its concerns regarding the merger. Specifically, the United
States indicated that prohibiting the merger would harm U.S. defense interests.
Moreover, a divestiture to a third party would likely be unsuccessful in
preserving Douglas as a stand-alone manufacturer of new aircraft, and this failure
would be anticompetitive because it would create a firm with the incentive and
means to raise prices and diminish services with respect to the provisions of
spare parts and Douglas' fleet. According to the Commission, it took the
concerns into consideration to the extent consistent with EU law.33 The
Commission limited the scope of review to the civil side of the operation.
According to the Commission, the merger affected the new large commercial
aircraft market.34 Segmentation of the large commercial jet aircraft market to
narrow-body and wide-body aircraft was accepted. Since the competition
problems resulting from the proposed merger were the same for both markets, the
Commission assessed the effects on both markets together.35 Given that large
31. Boeder and Sharp Interview, supra note 22. at 5.
33. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, 12.
34. Id. 13-19.
35. Id.9 16.
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commercial jet aircraft were sold and operated throughout the world under
similar conditions of competition and the transportation costs of delivery were
negligible, the geographic market was the world market.36
After defining the market, the Commission analyzed the effects of the merger
on the large commercial jet aircraft industry. There were three competitors on the
worldwide market: Boeing, Airbus and McDonnell Douglas.37 The Commission
analyzed the current structure of the markets for large commercial jet aircraft. In
particular, the Commission looked at the existing market shares of Boeing, the
size of its fleet in service, the long-term exclusive supply agreements with major
customers, the lack of potential new entrants, and that Boeing already enjoyed a
dominant position on the overall market for large commercial aircraft. 3' The
Commission then analyzed whether the merger would strengthen Boeing's
dominant position in large commercial aircraft either by the impact of
McDonnell's commercial aircraft business or by the overall effects resulting from
the defense and space business of McDonnell.39
The Commission considered the expansion of Boeing's market share and
other factors strengthening its dominance. For instance, McDonnell's "six
percent of market was enough to force Boeing to improve its price and
purchasing conditions to induce customers to purchase Boeing planes." ° There is
inconsistency between the market shares estimated in the United States and the
EU. The EU reported two percent more than the FTC, because it considered
backlogged orders, and because it focused on older and more certain market
shares.4
The EU Commission also accepted that Douglas was no longer a real force in
the commercial aircraft market.4 '2 However, the Commission still considered the
effect of Douglas' commercial aircraft business in the hands of Boeing. The
European Commission analyzed the effects of the increase in overall resources;
customer base,43 market shares, 4 capacity in commercial aircraft and skilled work
force; the ability to induce airlines to enter into more exclusive dealing
agreements; and bargaining power with suppliers due to its involvement with
defense and civil aircraft production. 4' Also it considered that Boeing's





40. Amy Ann Karpel, The European Commission's Decision on the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger
and the Need for Greater US-EU Cooperation in the Merger Field, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1029, 1054 (1998). See
also Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, 25.
41. Stock, supra note 19, at 857.
42. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, 57-9.
43. Id. 61-3 (showing an increase from 60% to 84% of the current fleet in service).
44. Id. 54 (indicating that the market share increased from 64% to 70%).
45. Id. I 18, 24; see also Karpel, supra note 39, at 1043.
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give Boeing additional leverage over the existing McDonnell Douglas aircraft
users, which comprised of twenty-four percent of the total aircraft fleet
worldwide. 6 The EU focused on the unilateral effects likely to result from those
factors.
The EU also analyzed Boeing's exclusive arrangements and looked at their
likely effects on competition. As discussed earlier, Boeing had recently entered into
exclusive arrangements for the supply of large commercial aircraft to American
Airlines, Delta and Continental Airlines. According to the EU Commission's
decision, it was estimated that 14,400 new aircraft would be delivered worldwide
between 1997 and 2016, of which 2400 are on firm order with Boeing, McDonnell
Douglas or Airbus. Boeing's exclusive deals include options and purchase rights that
account for thirteen percent of this open market, or over thirty percent of the U.S.
market.47 This was problematic because it would foreclose thirteen percent of the
market and also because the three airlines accounted for thirty percent of the U.S.
market for large commercial jet aircrafts. This factor was relevant to the merger
analysis due to its effect on creating or strengthening the dominant position of
Boeing and its unilateral effects. In the EU, it was argued these agreements should be
covered in the analysis because Merger Regulation, Article 8(2) applies to
restrictions that are necessary and directly relate to the implementation of the
concentration. Hence, these agreements were not ancillary.48
One other major difference in the analysis between the U.S. and EU's analysis
was the focus given to the link between McDonnell's civil and defense divisions.
The Commission analyzed the effect of military capacity on Boeing's civil aircraft
division and access to publicly funded research and development (R&D) in its
defense division.49 The EU focused on the overall effects resulting from the defense
and space business of Douglas. The agreements would strengthen Boeing's dominant
50position, would increase Boeing's overall financial resources, and increase Boeing's
access to publicly funded ("R&D")5land intellectual property portfolios. 52 Further,
Boeing would increase benefits obtained from the transfer of military technology to
commercial aircraft.53 For instance, it would be possible to transfer technology
developed under public funding on the military side to the commercial sector,
especially considering the U.S. policy that defense, space and commercial
technology are highly linked.54
46. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, 164, 68.
47. Id. T 46.
48. William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and
International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805, 836 (2001) (discussing exclusive licensing
agreements); see also Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, 48.
49. See generally Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10; see also Karpel, supra note 40, at 1054.
50. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, 72.
51. Id. in 83, 84-8 (noting that the R&D in the aerospace industry to a large extent funded government).
52. Id. In 102-03.
53. Id. 194.
54. Id. I 92, 99.
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According to the EU Commission decision using 1995 figures, Boeing's
commercial aircraft operations accounted for seventy percent of its total sales.
For McDonnell Douglas, seventy percent of its total business was related to
defense and space operations. Not taking into account Boeing's latest acquisition
of Rockwell Defense and Space activities, the merger would triple Boeing's
defense and space operation activities. This would significantly increase
Boeing's ability to cope with economic cycles in commercial aircraft, since the
revenues achieved in the defense sector appear to be more stable than the
commercial sector.55 Other concerns include the increase in Boeing's overall
financial resources, Boeing's access to publicly funded R&D56and intellectual
property portfolios.57 The EU focused on the integration of the commercial and
military sides and the resulting advantages and anticompetitive effects since the
merger would make Boeing the largest integrated aerospace company in the
world. 8 This merger might increase Boeing's bargaining power vis-A-vis
suppliers.59
Furthermore, in this market intellectual property is extremely important for
the competitive potential of players. The combination of the world's leading
manufacturer of commercial aircraft with the world's leading manufacturer of
military aircraft would result in the combination of two extremely large
portfolios of intellectual property. 60 Boeing has more than five hundred published
patents that are related to commercial aircraft and McDonnell Douglas holds
around one hundred fifty patents. 6' Eighty-six Boeing patents and twenty-six
McDonnell Douglas patents could potentially restrict access to important future
technology.62 In the end, this would increase Boeing's buying and bargaining
power vis-A-vis suppliers.
In the EU, Boeing's access to publicly funded R&D and intellectual property
portfolio in its defense division was a major issue. Would this increase Boeing's
overall power and financial resources and its ability to use this technology from
the military side on commercial aircraft?
63
55. Id. T 73.
56. Id. 83, 84-8.
57. Id. (H 102-03.
58. Id. 173.
59. Id. 106 (explaining that with this integration there will be increase in Boeing's buying power and
this would weaken competitive position of Airbus. Since, McDonnell Douglas is strong in military and Boeing
in commercial aircraft, this would increase suppliers overall reliance on Boeing. Boeing would exert pressure
on suppliers to discourage them to work with Airbus); see also United States Department of Defense, News
Release, July 1, 1997, DOD Finds Boeing's Acquisition of McDonnell Douglas Acceptable (Including a copy of
Deputy Secretary White's letter), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1997/b07OlI997_bt351-
97.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
60. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, IT 102-03 (noting that the Commission considers
the combination of Boeing and Douglas' know-how and patent portfolios to be further element for the
strengthening of Boeing's dominant position in large commercial aircraft).
61. Id. 102.
62. Id.
63. Id. 91 72 (indicating that Boeing's position will be strengthened). Boeing will have at its disposal,
219
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For these reasons, it was determined the merger would strengthen a dominant
position through which effective competition would be significantly impeded in
the common market.64 The merger would make Boeing the largest integrated
aerospace company in the world.65
6After Boeing made important concessions, the EU approved the merger. In
the next section, Boeing's concessions are outlined according to the area of
67concern.
a. Concerns Regarding Acquisition of McDonnell Douglas'
Commercial Side
First, Boeing agreed to preserve McDonnell Douglas' commercial aircraft as
a separate legal entity for ten years and supply a report to the EU. Boeing agreed
to provide customer support for McDonnell Douglas aircraft at the same high
quality level it provided for its Boeing aircraft. Boeing also agreed to apply the
same Boeing guidelines and procedures for spare parts availability and pricing,
and ensure appropriate levels of engineering support. Boeing agreed not to try to
persuade DAC operators to purchase Boeing parts and products by offering more
favorable terms to some operators over others. Moreover, Boeing will not use its
privileged access to the existing fleet in service of DAC aircraft to leverage its
opportunities for persuading current DAC operators to purchase Boeing aircraft.
b. Concerns from the Spillover Benefits from McDonnell Douglas'
Defense Business to Boeing's Commercial Airplane Business
Boeing agreed to license patents obtained under U.S. government-funded
contracts to commercial aircraft manufacturers on a non-exclusive, reasonable
royalty basis to be used in the manufacture or sale of commercial jet aircraft, and
to supply know-how related to such patents. Also, Boeing agreed to similar terms
for cross licensing of its blocking patents to commercial aircraft manufacturers
on non-exclusive and reasonable royalty. To provide increased transparency of
the R&D process regarding U.S. government aeronautics R&D projects, Boeing
agreed to supply an annual report to the European Commission on its current
unexpired patents arising from government funding contracts and on its non-
classified government funded aeronautics R&D for ten years. To prevent to
publicly funded research. Id. U 83-8. Boeing will also have benefits obtained from military technology to
commercial aircraft. Id. T 94.
64. Id.[ 113.
65. Id. 73.
66. The Boeing case is similar to Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland Case IV/M 053, but in Boeing,
instead of blocking the merger, it was accepted by concessions.
67. News Release, Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger Gains a Positive Opinion from the European
Commission (July 23, 1997), at http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/1997/news.release.970723.htm. (last
visited Oct. 4, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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leveraging its supply relationship to discriminate against other manufacturers of
large commercial aircraft, Boeing agreed not to exert or attempt to exert undue or
improper influence on its suppliers, directly or indirectly, by promising an
increase in supplies or subcontracted R&D activities, threatening to decrease
supplies or subcontracted R&D activities, or leveraging in any other way its own
supply relationship.
c. Concerns About Exclusive Dealing Agreements
Boeing agreed not to enter into new exclusive deal agreements until August
1, 2007 and not to enforce the existing agreements with American, Delta and
Continental Airlines.
In sum, the conclusion in two jurisdictions was different for the same merger.
In Europe, the concern was that the merger would increase the leverage that can
be exercised by a dominant firm and the EU looked at the possible impact of the
merger on competitors.68 In the United States, the focus was on the effect of the
merger on future prices and consumers, and McDonnell was no longer seen as a
competitor.
III. GE/HONEYWELL
There are also major differences in the approach used in the United States
and in the EU regarding the merger between GE and Honeywell. General Electric
is active in aircraft engines, appliances, information services, power systems,
lighting, industrial systems, medical systems, plastic, broadcasting, financial
services, and transportation systems.69 GE is the leading producer of jet engines
for large commercial aircraft and large jets, and also has an aircraft-leasing
subsidiary called GE Capital Aviation Services ("GECAS"). GE's principal
rivals are Pratt and Whitney ("P&W") and Rolls Royce. On the other hand,
Honeywell is a leading producer of engines for small regional and corporate jets,
and avionics and nonavionics, and Auxilary Power Units ("APUs").70 Honeywell
manufactures small gas turbine engines (jet engines), turbofan and turboprop
engines for business and regional aircraft, turboprop engines for agricultural
aircraft, and turboprop engines for the helicopter industry." Honeywell does not
field any high-bypass turbofan engines above 7,000 pounds of thrust and its
experience is in 3,500-7,000 pound-thrust ranges. 2 Honeywell has different rivals
68. Briefs; FTC Investigation of Intel Tracks Earlier Microsoft Case, FTC: WATCH, Sept. 29, 1997, no 485.
69. Case COMP/M 2220, 3 General Electric/Honeywell, Commission decision of July 3, 2001,
[hereinafter General Electric/Honeywell (EU)].
70. Id. T14.
71. Honeywell is also involved in automotive products, electronic materials, specialty chemicals,
performance polymers, transportation and power systems, home, building and industrial controls, in marine
ground power and air management.
72. Press Release, FORECAST INTERNATIONAL/DMS, GE and Honeywell: Their Positions in the
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in each market. In small jet engines, its competitors are P&W and Rolls Royce.
In avionics, the competitors are Rockwell Collins and Thales. For nonavionics,
United Technologies, BF Goodrich and Snecma are the competitors.73
The United States approved the merger between GE and Honeywell after
requiring divestiture of a helicopter engine business and authorization of a new
third-party maintenance, repair and overhaul ("MRO") service provider for
certain models of Honeywell aircraft engine business and APUs.74 However, the
EU found the merger anticompetitive and did not approve it.75
A. The United States
In the United States, the DOJ analyzed the merger and found that the only
horizontal overlap was in U.S. military helicopter engines. GE and Honeywell
76are two premier manufacturers of U.S. military helicopter engines. They
comprise two of the three firms authorized to service TFE731 turbofan engines
and related auxiliary power units manufactured by Honeywell. 77 The market was
defined narrowly compared to the EU definition. The United States defined the
market according to U.S. military helicopter engines and maintenance, MRO
service for certain Honeywell aircraft engines, and auxiliary power units. In
contrast, the EU Commission looked at markets more broadly by including
markets for aerospace and power systems, large commercial aircraft engines,
large regional jet aircraft engines and corporate jet engines, and avionics and
non-avionics products.
The DOD worked closely with the DOJ. The parties received all applicable
R&D funding from the DOD through the Joint Turbine Advanced Gas Generator
program, which began in 1998 to fund technological development of efficiencies
Gas Turbine Market, and GE's Standing After Purchasing of Honeywell (Wed. Nov. 8, 11:40 a.m. ET),
available at http://www.forecastl.com/notable/yah-fin.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer),
(noting GE's experience is in 8,500-9,200 pounds thrust range with CF 34 turbofan, growing up to 18,000
pounds). Honeywell produces one low-bypass turbofan, the 9,250 pound thrust F124. Id.
73. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Doborah Majoras, Remarks Before the Antitrust Law Section
State Bar of Georgia, GE Honeywell: The U.S. Decision, 128 (Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/public/speeches/9893.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
[hereinafter Deborah Majoras Remarks].
74. Press Release, DOJ, Justice Department Requires Divestiture in Merger between GE and
Honeywell, May 2, 2001, [hereinafter General Electric/Honeywell (U.S.)], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/press releases/2001/8140.htm. See Auxiliary Power Units, available at http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/
shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/sts-apu.html (explaining that the auxiliary power unit is a hydrazine-fueled,
turbine- driven power unit that generates mechanical shaft power to drive a hydraulic pump that produces
pressure for the orbiter's hydraulic system).
75. General Electric/Honeywell (EU) supra note 69, 567.
76. General Electric/Honeywell (U.S.), supra note 74 (explaining that GE diversified in manufacturing
and services in aircraft engines, household appearances, lighting, power generation, industrial controls, medical
imaging equipment and engineering plastics). GE revenues were approximately $130 billion in 2000.
Honeywell technology and manufacturing company in producing avionics products and services, home,
building, industrial controls, automotive products, power generation systems, specialty chemicals, fibers,
plastics, electronic and advanced materials. Sales approximately $25 billion in 2000. Id.
77. Id.
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in helicopter engine fuel consumption.7 ' Honeywell developed the modern hi-
bypass turbofan engine used in today's business jets under the Army's Joint
Turbine Advanced Gas Generator program. It also built turboshaft and turboprop
propulsion engines for business aviation, regional airlines, military aircraft, and
marine and industrial markets.
In the United States, the merger as originally proposed would have
substantially lessened competition in the production of U.S. military helicopter
engines and in the provision of heavy MRO service for certain Honeywell
aircraft engines and auxiliary power units.79 According to the press releases,
Honeywell's engines would enhance GE's position, with Honeywell's
turboshafts added to GE's repretoire. Also, GE would have engines on three of
the four most important U.S. Army helicopters, ° would become a powerful
competitor in any turbine engine market, and would be in a better position to
compete to future helicopter projects.81 In the United States, the parties agreed to
changes, which is an example of "fix it first" in which the parties agree to
changes in the deal to avoid being sued. The parties agreed to divest the
Honeywell helicopter engine business and to authorize a new service provider for
engines and auxiliary power units for certain models of Honeywell aircraft
engines and APUs.82
The Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the DOJ,
Charles James, defended the agency's enforcement position. He said the agency
conducted an extensive investigation and the merger with the modified remedies
will be beneficial to consumers. Moreover, the merged firm would offer better
products and services at lower prices than the firms could have individually.
83
However, because the case was settled with "fix it first" procedures, there is
no competitive impact statement and there has never been a case. Thus, there is
nothing available to support the idea that the merger would have been beneficial
to consumers other than James' assertions, press releases and unofficial
comments. There is no discussion of efficiencies, if there were any, and whether
claimed efficiencies were cognizable and specific enough under the Merger
Regulation. It is not clear from the limited information available why the merger
had efficiencies and why it was classified as merger rather than a joint venture or
bilateral agreement. In the United States, it was very difficult to assess these
78. Id. (noting that the DOD plans to allocate $5 billion over the next 20 years to develop next
generation helicopter engine, beginning no later than 2004).
79. Id.
80. UH-60 (T700), AH-64 (T700) and CH-47 (T55). GE and Honeywell: Their Positions in the Gas
Turbine Market, and GE's Standing After Purchasing of Honeywell, supra note 72.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Antitrust & Trade Regulation Daily (July 6, 2001). See also News Release, DOJ, Statement by
Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James on the EU's Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition
(July 3, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/200l/july/303at.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2004) (copy
on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter DOJ news release July 3, 2001].
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claims and policy because there is a gap in information, since most of the
information is not open to the public and the United States refuses to explain its
position. Some information is available through competitive impact statements.
However, because the DOJ decided not to challenge this merger, there is no
competitive impact statement.84
In sum, the merger in the United States was seen as offering improved
products and better prices than either firm would have offered independently.
Also, the proposed merger provided great incentive for competitors to improve
their own product offerings, which is the essence of competition.
B. The European Union
On the other hand, the Commission of the European Communities prohibited
GE's acquisition of Honeywell.86 The parties notified the Commission of the
proposed merger on February 5, 200187. On March 1, 2001, the Commission
started its in depth investigation and analyzed the markets for aerospace and
88power systems. Aerospace markets consisted of aircraft engines and relatedmarkets, avionics and non-avionics, and engine controls.
1. Jet Engines
There are three categories of jet engines: large commercial aircraft, regional
aircraft, and corporate aircraft. For jet engines for large commercial aircraft, there
was no horizontal overlap among the parties. GE was the only manufacturer of
jet engines for large commercial aircraft and there were also two other
competitors. 89 Regarding engines for large regional jets, GE and Honeywell were
the only two manufacturers, and there is a horizontal overlap between them.90
84. See Statement by Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James on the EU's Decision Regarding the
GE/Honeywell Acquisition, supra note 83. Also, DOJ reasoning was explained in the OECD meeting in Paris
(Cooperation and convergence, speech before the OECD global forum on competition Oct 17, 2001). The
Tunney Act requires a competitive impact statement to be filed with the proposed consent decree and CIS
describe the nature of the proceeding and explains the proposed consent decree and remedies available to the
parties.
85. John Deq Briggs and Howard Rosenblatt, A Bundle of Trouble: The Aftermath of GE/Honeywell, 16
ANTITRUST 26, 28 (Fall 2001) (quoting Charles James in his speech before the OECD global forum in Paris on
competition, Oct 17, 2000).
86. General Electric/Honeywell (EU), supra note 69, 567.
87. Id. Ii 1-2 (citing an agreement dated 22 October 2000, wherein GE agreed to acquire share capital of
Honeywell, and Honeywell would become a wholly owned subsidiary).
88. Id. 8.
89. Id. 10 (explaining that large commercial aircraft have more than 100 seats and cost in excess of
$35 million). This case looked at the joint ventures and alliances, the structural links of GE and GE's vertical
integration. That is why the market share of the alliance-CFMI-was attributed to GE when assessing
dominance. Id. 66.
90. Id. 10 (defining large regional jets as those with 30-90 seats and up to $30 million in value).
Horizontal market share amounts to 100 percent. Id. 21. GE was already dominant prior to the merger, the
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With jet engines for corporate aircraft, there is also horizontal overlap among
the parties in particular in the segment for engines for medium jets.
9' Honeywell
was considered the leading engine supplier in this market.92 On the other hand,
GE enjoyed a strong position in the market for engines for large commercial
aircrafts.
Additionally, the Commission considered factors contributing to GE's
dominance in engines. 93 First, the Commission considered GE's capital, unique
combination of complementary products and services to customers, its status as
one of the largest financial companies in the world, and that GE used its financial
strength to influence airlines in their purchasing behavior.94
The Commission also considered GE's vertical integration into aircraft
purchasing, financing and leasing activities through GECAS. 9s According to the
decision, there would be foreclosure through vertical integration of Honeywell
with GE, combination of Honeywell's activities with GE's financial strength and
vertical integration into financial services, aircraft purchasing and leasing, and
aftermarket services.96 The firms might offer packaged deals of GE and
Honeywell products and services together. 97 Such integration would enable the
merged entity to leverage the respective market power of the two companies into
the products of one another. This would have the effect of foreclosing
competitors, thereby eliminating competition in these markets. The EU
Commission ruled that this would ultimately adversely affect product quality,
service and consumers' prices. 98
In sum, the Commission considered that all these factors made GE's high
market shares the right proxy for dominance and gave GE the ability to foreclose
competition.
The Commission also looked at MRO. GE had a strong MRO market for
engines °° GE's position on the MRO market, coupled with the acquisition of
merged entity will have a monopoly position in large regional jets in the immediate future, and GE can be
considered as dominant. Id. 86-87.
91. Id. 34,88.
92. Id. i 83, 89 (noting that corporate aircraft engines are designed for corporate activities).
93. Id. 107-62.
94. Id. 83 (explaining that commonality across engine types also contributes to GE's dominance).
"[Alirlines using an aircraft powered by a particular type of engine generally tend to purchase incremental
engines from that same engine manufacturer.... prefer to purchase the same type of engine in the future owing




98. Id. 355; See also Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Antitrust in the
U.S. and Europe: A History of convergence, General Counsel Roundtable American Bar Association
Washington, D.C., 14 November 2001 (explaining that while conglomerate mergers usually not anit-
competitive, sometimes they lead to exclusionary effects and stifled competition).
99. General Electric/Honeywell (EU), supra note 69, 1 163.
100. Id.T 102.
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Honeywell's product range, is likely to give the merged entity a significant
financial and commercial advantage.'0 '
In addition, the Commission looked at competitors to determine if they
would provide an effective competitive constraint on GE. The Commission
considered P&W and Rolls-Royce, and determined that these companies were
both unable to provide an effective competitive constraint on GE' 2 The
Commission also considered the countervailing buyer power and found it to be
limited.' °3 In conclusion, the Commission found GE to be in position to behave
independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately consumers. Thus, GE
would be dominant on the markets for large commercial jet aircraft engines and
for large regional jet aircraft engines.' 4 GE was already dominant in markets for
large commercial aircraft engines and large regional jet aircraft engines, and its
dominance would only be strengthened by the merger.' 5 No other engine
manufacturer had the size, financial strength or vertical integration to compete."
2. Avionics' °7 and Non-Avionics'08
Avionics is subdivided into large commercial aircraft and regional/corporate
aircraft. Non-avionics is a subdivided among large commercial aircrafts,
regional, corporate and any other aircraft segment.'09 Honeywell is the leading
supplier of aerospace equipment and non-avionics products. GE is not active in
this market. Rockwell Collins, Thales, and Hamilton Sunstrand are Honeywell's
three major competitors and the merger will affect them."0 Unlike these
competitors, however, Honeywell has a unique product range, and can offer a
complete range of avionics equipment.'' Honeywell is also strong in services and
MRO."12 Also, "Honeywell is in a strong position to integrate across the entire
aircraft industry... and is well positioned to pursue a strategy of packaging its
101. ld. 106.
102. Id. IN 174-223.




107. General Electric/Honeywell (EU), supra note 69, 1231 (explaining that avionics products "relate to
range of equipment used for control of the aircraft for navigation and communication as well as assessment of
the flying conditions").
108. Id. 234 (including auxiliary power units, environmental control systems, electric power, wheels
and brakes, landing gear and aircraft lighting).
109. Id. 235.
110. Id. 1H 298-329.
111. Id. 1276.
112. Id. 283.
113. Id. 289 (referring to the fact that Honeywell has integration know-how, and a complete range of
products, and airframe manufacturers that are increasingly relying on the integration capabilities of suppliers).
226
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products and bundling."' 14 In sum, "Honeywell is the leading supplier of a range
of avionics and non-avionics products, and no competitor is independently
capable of replicating its extensive range of products.""'
3. Engine Controls
"Honeywell has important market positions in a number of engine
accessories and controls."' 6 GE is not active in those markets."
7 However, GE's
position in the downstream market for jet engines, combined with Honeywell's
upstream position for engine accessories and controls, creates a vertical
relationship in the market.". "The merger would lead to vertical foreclosure
effects, stemming from the elimination of Honeywell as an independent supplier
of engine controls to jet engine manufacturers competing with GE."
' 9 Honeywell
and Hamilton account for ninety percent of the market.
4. Power Systems
Following the merger, GE/Honeywell's market shares would increase, and it
would become the strongest player in the market, making it four to five times
larger than the nearest competitor.'20 Moreover, "Honeywell's leading position in
this market would be strengthened by combining it with GE's financial strength,
as well as vertical integration in the financial services and aftermarket services
markets."''
The proposed merger would lead to anticompetitive effects as a result of the
horizontal, vertical and conglomerate integration of the merging parties'
activities. "The merger will result in the creation and strengthening of a dominant
position in the markets for large commercial aircraft engines, large regional jet





116. Id. 1 331 (explaining that GE has a dominant position in the downstream market for jet engines and
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The parties submitted undertakings both on June 14, 2001 and June 28, 2001,
well beyond the deadline for submission of undertakings. GE proposed a new set
of remedies, but they were not accepted because they would not remove
competition concerns. The Commission found the proposed undertakings
insufficient. 2 1 Commissioner Mario Monti, the Commissioner responsible for
competition policy, mentioned that there were ways to eliminate the concerns,
but the proposed undertakings were not enough. The proposed merger was
declared incompatible with the common market pursuant to Article 8(3) of theM erger • 124
Merger Regulation. This was the second time the EU prohibited a merger
involving only American firms. The first time the EU did this was when it
prevented the MCl!WorldCom-Sprint merger2
The parties have appealed to the European Court of First Instance in
Luxembourg. Since the case was not appealed under the new fast track
procedure, it is not certain how long the appeal will take. The companies did not
petition for the decision to block the merger be overturned. It seems they want to
prove the arguments made by the Commission were simply wrong. 26
In sum, there were differences between the two systems. The above-mentioned
points that were discussed in the EU were not analyzed in the United States. Once
more, it is very hard to follow the United States' logic and analysis, and there is
limited information about the United States' analysis.
However, after the EU decided not to approve the merger, the Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Deborah Platt Majoras discussed some of the points
in a speech that might provide some guidance to the U.S. approach.' 27 According
to her statement, the DOJ disagrees with many findings of the EU Commission.
To begin with, the DOJ disagrees with the finding that GE has a dominant
position in the large jet engines market. According to her, GE did not have a
dominant position because GE's shares entirely depend on a sole-source contract
with Boeing for the 737. If these sales are excluded, the market shares would be:
123. Id. il 546-549 (finding no exceptions to the three month time limit on the submission of
undertakings) The commission further stated that any changes could have been included in the 14 June
submission. Id.
124. Id. 567.
125. MCI/WorldCom-Sprint, Case No COMP/M.1741. The opposite also happened when EU cleared it,
U.S. blocked it. The United States blocked France's Air Liquide of Britain's BOC although EU cleared it. See
Timothy J. Muris, FTC, Merger Enforcement in a World of Multiple Arbiters, Brookings Institution Roundtable
on Trade and Investment Policy, Washington, D.C., December 21, 2001, at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris
brookings.pdf (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
The EU decided over 1,700 merger cases, 400 involved at least one U.S. based firm. The EU
required undertakings as a condition of clearing a deal in about nine percent. In four percent,
the parties. withdrew from the proposed transaction in face of a likely antitrust challenge. EU
prohibited mergers of U.S. based firms in only two cases: WorldCom MCI/Sprint and
GE/Honeywell. WorldCom MCI/Sprint was also challenged by DOJ. The EU blocked 16
other mergers, none of which involved a U.S. firm. Id.
126. Antitrust & Trade Regulation Daily, September 14, 2001.
127. Majoras, supra note 73.
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GE forty-four percent, P&W twenty-three percent and Rolls Royce twenty-seven
percent. Consequently, GE does not have a dominant position.1
2s As to the
concerns posed by the EU regarding vertical integration of Honeywell with GE
[integration of financial services, aircraft purchasing and leasing and aftermarket
services],'29 Majoras argued it was not a concern because GECAS's share of
aircraft purchase was less than ten percent, which is substantially less than thirty
to forty percent requirement that the U.S. courts require as a minimum to support
a finding of potential foreclosure. Also, Majoras mentioned that there was no
evidence that GECAS was only purchasing GE engines to foreclose rivals from
the market. She argued that even if they were to bundle, there were no evidence
that other firms would be unable to match the merged firm's offerings (by
counterstrategies like mergers, teaming arrangements, buying power or by
offering their own multi-product packages) 13 , and thus would be unable to
compete.' Competitors have growing revenues and profits and they are
increasingly investing in the new generation of engines.
132 Buyers are also
powerful and provide strong incentives to maintain competition in the supply of
avionics and nonavionics. 33 The ability of competitors to respond to a more
efficient competitor might have been underestimated.
However, as mentioned above, due to limited information on the U.S. side, it
is hard to follow the reasoning from the decision. As will be discussed in a
subsequent section, the EU's theories are not alien to American law as a
historical matter. Similar approaches were followed in the United States in the
1960s-70s.
128. Id. at 5.
129. General Electric/Honeywell (EU), supra note 69, 342.
130. Majoras, supra note 73, at 10. That was also the EU Commission's view in the Allied
Signal/Honeywell (M 1601 (1999)) merger.
131. Portfolio Effects in the Conglomerate Mergers. Range Effects: The U.S. Perspective, Antitrust
Division-Submission for OECD Roundtable, at page 21, dated Oct.. 12, 2002 and discussed Oct. 19, 2001,
[hereinafter Antitrust Division Submission OECD]; William J Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, DOJ, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's a Long Way From Chicago to Brussels,
10 GEO MASON L REV. 533, 539 (2002) (providing that there is no evidence that Pratt & Whitney or Rolls
Royce were no longer in a position to constrain GE's behavior).
132. Antitrust Division Submission, supra note 131 (noting that the competitors had outperformed GE
in engine awards on the three major airframe offering a choice of engines). GE won 42% of contract awards,
Pratt 32% and Rolls Royce 27%. Id.
133. Majoras, supra note 73, at 11.
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IV. DIFFERENCES'34
As stated, the outcomes in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell
were very different. I believe the discrepancies were not a result of the different
effects of the merger on different markets, but due to how the two jurisdictions
analyzed and approached the problems. The likely differences in approach can be
placed into three groups. The first group focuses on the effect of the merger. For
instance, the EU focuses on competitors and the United States focuses on
consumers. Also in the EU, the focus is more on single dominance and
monopoly, whereas in the United States the focus is on oligopoly and
coordination. The second group of differences involves the approach to




When there is a merger, the EU Commission looks at effects on competitors
and measures the competitive harm in terms of actual injury to competitors.'35
However, in the United States, the focus is on how the merger will impact
consumers, increase prices and reduce output. Since the European Commission
134. See, e.g., Robert J. Reynolds & Janusz A Ordovers, Archimedean Leveraging and the
GE/Honeywell Transaction, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 171 (2002); Edward T. Swaine, "Competition, Not
Competitors, " Nor Canards: Ways of Criticizing the Commission, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON L. 597 (2002); Ryan
Marth, The Canadian Middle Road: Balancing Efficiency and Sovereignty in the Age of Multijurisdiction
Merger Review, 12 MINN J. GLOBAL TRADE, 221 (2003), Lawson A.W. Hunter QC & Susan M Hutton, Where
There Is a Way: Cooperation in Canada-U.S. Antitrust Relations, 20 CAN-US L.J. 101 (1994); John Deq. Briggs
& Howard Rosenblatt, A Bundle of Trouble: The Aftermath of GE/Honeywell, 16 ANTITRUST 26 (2001); Stefan
Schmitz, The European Commission's Decision in GE/Honeywell and the Question of the Goals of Antitrust
Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON L. 539 (2002); Stefan Schmitz, How Dare They? European Mergers Control and
the European Commission's Blocking of the General Electric/Honeywell Merger, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON L.
325 (2002); Jeff King, Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Revisited: Recommendations for a Unitary Merger Defense,
11 -WTR KAN J. L & PUB POL'Y 363 (2002); William J Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's
a Long Way From Chicago to Brussels, 10 GEO MASON L. REV. 533 (2002); Castaneda, Collins, Crampton,
Harty, Peterson, Matthews, Solomon, Stock, International Legal Developments in Review 2001, 36 INT'L LAW
287 (2001); Lisa M Renzi, The GE/Honeywell Merger: Catalyst in the Transnational Conglomerate Merger
Debate, 37 NEW ENG L. REV. 109 (2002); Yeo Jin Chun, GE-Honeywell Merger Debacle: The Enforcement of
Antitrust Competition Laws Across the Atlantic Pond, 15 NY INT'L L. REV. 61 (2002); Gotz Drauz, Unbundling
GE/Honeywell: The Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers Under EC Competition Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
885 (2002); Dimitri Giotakos, GE/Honeywell: A Theoretic Bundle Assessing Conglomerate Mergers Across the
Atlantic, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON L. 469 (2002); William Kolasky, GE'Honeywell: Continuing the Transatlantic
Dialog, 23 U. PA J. INT'L ECON L 513 (2002); Jay Pil Choi, A Theory of Mixed Bundling Applied to the
GE/Honeywell Merger, 16 ANTITRUST 32 (2001); Eleanor Fox, Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and
the Future of Merger Control, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON L. 457 (2002). William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic
Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and International Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 377 (2001).
135. Kauper, supra note 26, at 334.
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focuses on competitors, the EU was alleged to be protectionist, especially with
regard to foreign companies.1 36 The other decisions of the Commission are
consistent; the Merger Regulation suggests that the effect of a concentration on a
competitor should be taken into account. 37 In the EU, competitors' views are
sought, and considerable weight is given to those views.1
3
1
In Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, the Commission looked at the ability of the
other competitors in the market. Specifically, it looked at Airbus and considered
its competitiveness in the commercial aircraft business since the merger would
leave only two commercial aircraft manufacturers.'39 The constraints on Airbus'
ability to compete with Boeing were analyzed.
According to the EU decision, the proposed merger would increase Boeing's
buying power and increase its bargaining power with suppliers because of its
involvement with defense and civil aircraft production and McDonnell Douglas'
strength in military aircraft and Boeing in commercial aircraft.' 40 According to
the EU Commission, the merger would weaken the competitive position of
Airbus, and allow Boeing to use its leveraging power to exert pressure on
numerous suppliers to discourage them from working with Airbus.14' To remedy
this, Boeing agreed not to abuse its relationship with its customer base.
The way the EU analyzed the exclusive arrangements shows its concern for
protecting competition. For instance, the EU treated these agreements as relevant
to the merger analysis, and as lessening Airbus' ability to compete for a large
number of commercial aircraft contracts. This is because Airbus does not
produce a full family of aircraft and therefore cannot enter into exclusive deals. 42
Accordingly, the parties agreed to give up existing exclusive dealing agreements
and not to enter into similar ones.141
The EU Commission also analyzed the integration of commercial and
military side and the anticompetitive effects on Airbus. In particular, the focus
was on the R&D in the government funded military side and its spillover effects
136. Id. at 338. Commissioner Mario Monti commented on the different outcome of the GE/Honeywell
case: "We might interpret facts differently and forecast the effects of an operation in different ways; this does
not mean that one authority is doing a technical analysis and the other is pursuing a political goal," Antitrust
& Trade Regulation Daily, July 13, 2001 (discussing EU merger control, competition policy after
GE&Honeywell).
137. Merger Regulation Article 2, Karpel, supra note 26, at 1056-1057; see also Thomas P. O'Toole,
The Long Arm of the Law-European Merger Regulation and its Application to the Merger of Boeing &
McDonnell Douglas, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAW 203 (1998).
138. See Kauper, supra note 26, at 338, 340 (stating considerable weight was given to evidence
submitted by Airbus).
139. O'Toole, supra note 137, at 231-35.
140. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, IN 24, 106; Karpel, supra note 49, at 1043.
141. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, 106. Jeffrey A Miller, The Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas merger: the European Commission's Costly Failure to Properly Enforce the Merger Regulation, 22
MD J INT'L L. & TRADE 359,366 (1999).
142. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, 70.
143. Article p1043: cessation of exclusive agreements-postpone until 2007.
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in the commercial side. According to the EU Commission decision, there are
extremely large differences between the United States and the EU on publicly
funded research. In the United States, the funding is very high as compared to the
funding provided for similar purposes in Europe. ' " Prior to the proposed merger,
the U.S. government funded R&D was split between two companies. According
to the decision, if the merger went through as originally requested, total
government funded R&D would be concentrated in one single entity, resulting in
the largest commercial aircraft business in the world.45 As a result, the parties
agreed to share military technology and provide access to intellectual property
patents as well as the underlying know-how generated from publicly-funded
research with other jet aircraft manufacturers.
4 6
As discussed above, all the agreed concessions support the view that the EU
system protects competitors: giving up exclusive dealing agreements; the
commitment of Boeing not to abuse its relationship with its customer base;
sharing with other jet aircraft manufacturers military technology and giving
access to intellectual property patents and underlying know-how generated from
publicly funded research.
47
However, in the United States, the analysis did not look at how the merger
would harm competitors themselves. Instead, the United States focused on the
ineffectiveness of McDonnell Douglas as a competitor and the overall impact the
merger would have on the market for consumers. In the large commercial aircraft
market there were three competitors on the worldwide market: Boeing, Airbus
and McDonnell Douglas. After the merger, there would be only two left.
Although this was an important fact in the EU analysis, the United States did not
consider this to be a critical issue in its analysis.
Similar differences existed in the GE/Honeywell case. In the United States, it
was approved with divestiture, but not approved by the EU. Charles James
commented on the different outcomes of the same case with the European Union
and asserted that:
Having conducted an extensive investigation of the GE/Honeywell
acquisition, the Antitrust Division reached a firm conclusion that the
merger, as modified by the remedies we insisted upon, would have been
pro-competitive and beneficial to consumers. Our conclusion was based
on findings, confirmed by customers worldwide, that the combined firm
could offer better products and services at more attractive prices than
either firm could offer individually. That in our view is the essence of
competition. The EU however, apparently concluded that a more
diversified, and thus more competitive, GE could somehow disadvantage
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other market participants. Consequently, we appear to have reached
different results from similar assessments of competitive conditions in
the affected markets. Clear and longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds
that antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors. Today's EU
decision reflects a significant point of divergence.1
8
Commissioner Mario Monti's responded to this criticism' 9 in an interview
stating that
[t]he goal of competition policy, in all its aspects, is to protect consumer
welfare by maintaining a high degree of competition in the common
market. Competition should lead to lower prices, a wider choice of
goods, and technological innovation, all in the interest of the consumer...
In the GE/Honeywell case not only competitors, but also customers, did
complain. 5°
However, as discussed above, the EU Commission's concern for competitors is
evident.
Although it is not a requirement, there should be consistency among the EU
Commission decisions. 5' Havilland, GE/Honeywell, Boeing McDonnell Douglas
all are similar in approach, and the outcomes were consistent. For instance, in the
Havilland case, the analysis focused on the merger's impact on competitors.'52
The Commission looked at the effect of eliminating Havilland as a competitor,
the effect on the customer base, evaluation of the remaining and potential
competition, the position of customers and the strength of the customers.
ATR/Havilland could undercut the market by reducing prices once it benefited
from the overlap in spare parts stock.'53 The Commission assessed the current and
expected future strength of the remaining competitors to determine whether the
new combined entity would be able to act independently of its competitors. The
Commission found a mere hypothetical possibility that a price war could drive
the merged company's rivals out of the market, and found this to be sufficient
evidence of market disturbance that would significantly impede competition. '
5 4
148. DOJ Press Release, July 3, 2001 a http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases /2001/8510.htm
(July 3, 2001); Antitrust & Trade Regulation Daily, July 6, 2001.
149. Mario Monti, The Future for Competition Policy in the EU, available at http://europa.eu.int/
rapid/setLanguage.do?language=en (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer); Merchant Taylor's Hall,
Merger control: issues highlighted in the context of the GRIHoneywell Merger (London 9 July 2001) (asking
the question: Is it true that Commission cares more about competitors than customers?).
150. Id.
151. Karpel, supra note 40, at 1048.
152. Kauper, supra note 26, at 341.
153. Miller, supra note 141, at 380.
154. Case No IV/M.053 Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, council regulation (EEC) No 4064/89; see
also Stock, supra note 19, at 853.
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Overall, the focus in the United States is on the impact on consumers and
effect on prices. In the EU, the focus is the effect on competitors and consumers.
An equitable balance is important because if the focus is only on competitors, it
might harm consumers in the long run by preventing competitors from becoming
more efficient and innovative. And if the focus is solely on consumers and not
the competitors, competition might also be negatively affected in the long run. If
there are few effective competitors in the market, the merger will make an
already dominant company more dominant, and the other competitors might
eventually leave the market.
2. Single Firm/Collective Dominance
There are differences between the EU and the United States as to whether the
focus should be on single firm dominance or collective dominance. Although
both systems use both the unilateral and coordinated effects analysis, the
anticompetitive analysis developed differently. The EU started with single firm
dominance and the ability to raise prices and act. It then moved toward
oligopolistic markets and collective dominance-collusion, parallel pricing and
behavior.' On the other hand, the United States started with collusion
concerns, 5 6 and coordinated interaction, and then moved toward "unilateral
effects" analysis.' 7 Today, the analysis used in both jurisdictions is similar.
However, the United States focuses more on oligopoly coordination and the EU
focuses more on single firm dominance.'
8
In analyzing mergers, the EU focuses on several factors. Specifically, it looks
at single firm dominance, creating or strengthening of a dominant position,
monopoly creation, whether the merger would increase a dominant firm's ability
to exercise its leverage power, and the possible impact of the merger on
competitors. The EU, presumes that it is less likely that remaining firms will
collude, and that they would actively compete and check the market power of the
dominant firms if they have sufficient strength to do so.' 9 When mergers create a
market structure that increases the firm's share or creates leveraging
opportunities due to market share increase, the merger is seen as strengthening a
dominant position.' 6° Commitments would prohibit or approve merged entities
155. EU uses the term "likely to engage in anti-competitive parallel behavior," and "conditions make it
likely for a tacit coordination when analyzing oligopolistic dominance."
156. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, years 1982,
1984, at §§ 3.11-3.44, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rpt. (CCH) 13, available at http:www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger
.htm#guidlines (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
157. Merger Guidelines, supra note 156, year 1992 at § 2.2.
158. Debra A. Valentine, General Counsel FTC, Building a Cooperative Framework for Oversight in
Mergers: The Answer to Extraterritorial Issue in Merger Review, 6 GEO MASON L. REV. 525 (1998).
159. Kauper, supra note 26, at 344.
160. Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect,
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 377, 397 (2002).
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and would drive rivals out or foreclose the competition, as was the case in
Havilland, Boeing and GE/Honeywell, where there was more emphasis on
unilateral effects. Examples include the exclusive dealing in the GE/Honeywell
case, McDonnell Douglas' repair and maintenance business for the existing fleet,
and the commercial side and military side in the hands of Boeing. The
Commission tried to solve these concerns with the agreed concessions.
Additionally, U.S. law focuses more on cartel facilitation rather than
monopoly creation. The United States measures harm more directly in terms of
output and price effects felt by consumers, as opposed to the competitors of the
dominant firm.'6' The United States is more concerned with oligopolist pricing in
concentrated markets162 and presumes that when concentration is high, remaining
firms will collude and they will benefit from that collusion. This explains why
the United States places less emphasis on competitors, competitive leverage,
competitors' strength as a counterweight to the power of the merged entity and
more emphasis on the affect of the merger on future prices, output, and
163consumers.
a. Conglomerate Effects
One other difference between the United States and the EU is the analysis of the
conglomerate effects of mergers. The theory refers to the traditional leveraging
theory-tying' 64 or bundling. 65 The concern is that the merged entity will have the
ability and incentive to leverage its market power from one market into other
markets, foreclose competitors and eliminate competition. This will eventually lead
to higher prices and loss of welfare. Conglomerate effects are discussed in the
following cases: Guinness/Grandmet,66 Allied Signal-Honeywell, 16 7 Vodafone
161. See Stock, supra note 19, at 830-831 (citing Pitofsky found at Robert Pitofsky Chairman FTC, EU
and U.S. Approaches to International Mergers, EC Merger Control 10th Anniversary Conference. The
European Commission DG Competition, International Bar Association, 14-15 September 2000 Metropole
Hotel, Brussels, Belgium and Robert Pitofsky, Address Before the Business Development Associates, Staples
and Boeing: What They Say About Merger Enforcement at the FTC, September 23, 1997, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ speeches/pitofsky/STAPLESspc.htm).
162. Stock, supra note 19, at 842.
163. See Kauper, supra note 26, at 335.
164. Roundtable Discussion, Transatlantic Antitrust: Convergence or Divergence?, Francisco-Enrique
Gonzales-Diaz, 16 ANTITRUST 5 (2001).
165. Jay Pil Choi, A Theory of Mixed Bundling Applied to the GE/Honeywell Merger, 16 ANTITRUST 32,
32(2001).
166. Case No IV/M.938 Guinness/Grand Metropolitan (1997). The merged firm would have a broad
range of products that would give it a driving force in the market, as well as a flexibility in pricing and
marketing opportunities. The merged firm would have the ability to tie products, bundle sales, and have joint
promotions, advertising, and discount campaigns. Since the competitors were weak, there was not enough
countervailing buyer power, and barriers to entry were difficult. The merger was found to create and strengthen
a dominant position, but it was approved after the full compliance with commitments. The merger was approved
subject to conditions. Divestiture of two brands at the European level was required. Id.
167. Case No IV/M.1601, Allied Signal/Honeywell (1999).
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Airtouch-Mannesmann,16  Coca-Cola/Carlsberg, 69  Tetralaval/Sidel,7 °  and
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas.' GE/Honeywell72 is the latest case in which the EU
focuses on conglomerate effects.'73
The EU's concern about conglomerate effects is sometimes referred to as
portfolio effects or range effects. 174 According to Mario Monti:
Our view is that whilst conglomerate mergers are normally not anti-
competitive, under some circumstances they can lead to exclusionary
effects and a worsening of competition conditions. . . . Conglomerate
mergers will raise concerns when they make possible that the merged
entity leverages its market power with the effect or object to foreclose
one or several markets from effective competition. These foreclosing
practices, which are not based on normal business performance or
"competition on the merits", may substantially reduce consumers' choice
and ultimately lead to higher prices and a loss of welfare.'75
In the EU, the analysis was very broad in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
case. The Commission looked at the conglomerate effects, focusing on
McDonnell Douglas' commercial aircraft business, defense-military business,
and repair and maintenance business for Boeings existing fleet. The Commission
analyzed the effects on the increase in overall resources, customer base, market
shares, capacity in commercial aircraft and skilled work force, and ability to
induce airlines to enter into more exclusive dealing agreements. Moreover, it
168. Case No IV/M 1795, Vodafone Airtouch-Mannesmann (2000) 42 (discussing the integrated
network and how it will be able to provide advanced telecommunication services to all customers on a seamless
pan-European basis).
169. Case No IV/M 833, Coca-Cola/Carlsberg (1997) (discussing the concern about tying and enhanced
efficiencies, economies of scale).
170. Case No Comp/M 2416, TetraLaval/Sidel (2001) [hereinafter Tetra Laval/Sidel] (describing Tetra
as the world's uncontested leader for carton packaging with an overall market share in Europe of over 80
percent). Sidel, on the other hand, is the leading manufacturer plastic PET packaging equipment and in
particular stretch blow-moulding (SBM) machines. The combination of Tetra's dominant position in carton
packaging and Sidel's leading position in PET packaging equipment would provide the merged entity with the
ability and incentives to leverage its dominant position in carton to gain a dominant position in PET packaging
equipment. In addition, by eliminating Sidel as a competitor in a closely neighboring market, Tetra's existing
dominant position in carton would also be strengthened. Due to the serious competition concerns the
Commission prohibit the merger. Id.
171. See Charles River Associates, CRA Insights, Fall 2001
at http://www.crai.com/Showpubs.aspPubid=2518 (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (discussing
the broad product range, existing fleet in service, cost savings from commonality benefits, size, scope, and
government funded R&D). The author contends that the Boeing/McDonnell case demonstrates the existence of
a large number of opportunities to engage in pricing practices. Id.
172. Offering low price bundles, leverage existing dominance in aircraft engines into avionics and non-
avionics. GE's leasing arm would only buy Honeywell.
173. CRA Insights, supra note 171.
174. Monti, supra note 98, at 5.
175. Id.
236
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considered the additional leverage the McDonnell Douglas' spare parts and
maintenance business would give Boeing over the existing McDonnell Douglas
aircraft users. On the commercial and defense side of the relationship, the
Commission analyzed how the integration would increase Boeing's overall
financial resources, its access to publicly funded R&D, and its intellectual
property portfolio. The EU Commission also analyzed the exclusive
arrangements that Boeing recently entered into for the supply of large
commercial aircraft to American Airlines, Delta, and Continental Airlines. The
merger would make Boeing the largest integrated aerospace company in the
world.
17 6
In the GE/Honeywell case, the Commission looked at mixed bundling and
cross-subsidization issues. It considered leveraging through vertical integration
and foreclosure using GE's financial strength, vertical integration of Honeywell
with GE, and Honeywell's leading position in some of the markets. The EU
looked at the mixed bundling issues, the merged entity offering packages of
engines and avionics for lower prices. 77 It was argued that the competitors would
not be able to offer similar deals and would be driven out of the market and this
would in the long run affect the competition process.
Later, the Commission looked at vertical integration to purchasing and
leasing by GECAS. The Commission argued that since GECAS was in the
leasing business, it might influence airlines to select similar equipments in the
future and tie its leasing services to GE engines. 78 Thus, GECAS would have the
incentive and ability to enhance market position of GE's engines by its
purchasing leverage.
Finally, the Commission considered the combination of GE's financial
strength, vertical integration of Honeywell with GE, the combination of
Honeywell's activities with GE's financial strength and vertical integration into
financial services, aircraft purchasing and leasing and aftermarket services. 79 It
also reviewed foreclosure through packaged offers of GE and Honeywell
products and services. 8° Such integration would enable the merged entity to
leverage the respective market power of the two companies into the products of
one another. The EU argued that the competitors were not able to meet these and
will exit the market eventually.
However, in the United States, the analysis is more narrow in comparison
with the EU approach. The agency in the United States focused on the likely
price effects in the future and did not look at the exclusive dealing agreements.
The United States viewed the exclusive dealing agreements as independent of the
176. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (EU), supra note 10, at 73.
177. General Electric/Honeywell (EU), supra note 69, at 349.
178. A criticism to this approach is absent monopoly power or dominant position, the competitors can
replicate.
179. General Electric/Honeywell (EU), supra note 69, at 342.
180. Id. at 349.
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merger. The FTC did not look at McDonnell Douglas' commercial side in the
hands of Boeing. Lastly, the FTC did not find any concerns with the combination
of Boeing with McDonnell Douglas' military side.
The antitrust division discussed the conglomerate effects issue. Specifically,
the GE/Honeywell case was discussed by the antitrust division in a report
submitted for an OECD Roundtable on portfolio effects in conglomerate
mergers. ' In this report, it was argued that the EU approach in GE/Honeywell
and other conglomerate mergers is similar to the U.S. approach during 1965-
1975.82 Under this approach, mergers were condemned if they strengthened an
already dominant firm through greater efficiencies or gave the acquired firm
access to broader line of products or greater financial resources."'
In the 1970s and 80s, the U.S. conglomerate merger wave faded. 8 4 As
discussed in this report, the U.S. antitrust agencies concluded that antitrust should
rarely interfere with any conglomerate mergers for three reasons. First, it is hard
to identify any conditions under which a conglomerate merger would give the
merged firm ability and incentive to raise prices and restrict output. Second,
bundling services could benefit consumers. Third, they generate significant
efficiencies, thus satisfying the U.S.'s goal of efficiency. The United States is
worried that this would affect the efficiency considerations.'85 Some criticized the
conglomerate effects approach and argued this approach placed interests of
competitors ahead of consumers and led to blocking efficiency enhancing
mergers on highly speculative and improvable theories of competitive harm.
18 6
The United States eliminated conglomerate effects as a basis for challenging non-
horizontal mergers in the 1982 Merger Guidelines. U.S. antitrust agencies
conclude that antitrust should rarely, if ever, interfere with any conglomerate
merger since conglomerate mergers generate efficiencies. In the United States,
there is greater confidence in the market, especially when strong rivals and
buyers who will usually find a way to protect themselves. On the other hand, the
EU is more reliant on government involvement.'
87
In sum, these cases exhibit differences in assessing conglomerate effects and
bundling.'88 The EU argued that bundling and offering package deals would have
181. Antitrust Division Submission OECD, supra note 131.
182. Id. at 2; see also Charles Stark, US-EU Merger Review Roundtable-Convergence, Divergence or
Both? Views From the Private Sector and Reaction from Officials, SUMMARY OF THE MEETING BY AT-
MEMBERS REPORT (1967, Procter & Gamble), available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/divisions/regulation/
useu.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
183. Antitrust Division Submission OECD, supra note 131, at 2.
184. William J. Kolasky, supra note 131, at 535.
185. Id.
186. Antitrust Division Submission OECD, supra note 131, at 15; see also Donna E Patterson & Carl
Shapiro, Transatlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell: Causes and Lessons, 16 ANTITRUST 18, 26 (2001).
187. William J. Kolasky, supra note 131, at 538 (stating that the EU has greater confidence in
government intervention).
188. John Deq Briggs and Howard Rosenblatt, supra note 85, at 29-30.
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anticompetitive effects and lead to market foreclosure.
s9 Whereas, the United
States saw it as a driving force for competitors to lower prices that will
eventually enhance competition.
Recent developments in the EU might affect the GE/Honeywell decision on
appeal and eventually change the criteria for conglomerate effects. Recently, the
Court of First Instance overturned a Commission decision, Tetra Laval and Sidel,
which focused on similar arguments as GE/HoneywelL'90
The following short summary of the case shows that the court did not agree
with the Commission's economic analysis or the way the Commission used the
bundling theory. The court did not rule that the bundling theory could not be
used, but instead the court raised the burden of proof for the Commission,
requiring the Commission to prove that companies have a financial incentive and
are able to bundle products. 9 ' The court found that the Commission failed to
prove its bundling theory. This case might weaken the Commission's position on
the conglomerate effects argument in the GE/Honeywell case on appeal since the
bundling theory was one of the main arguments. However, Commissioner Monti
saw no links between the Court's rulings against the Commission in the other
192cases.
Tetra Laval intended to acquire Sidel and the deal fell within the scope of the
Merger Regulation. After the second phase the Commission declared the notified
transaction incompatible. 93 The Commission considered that the merger would
have foreseeable anticompetitive effects in three ways. First, Tetra could use its
dominant position in global carton packaging to leverage its position to the
plastic packaging market by offering the two products to clients in need of both
types of packaging. This would eventually eliminate competition 
in the market.194
Second, Tetra could reinforce its current dominant position in aseptic carton
packaging market to eliminate competitive constraints. Third, it could strengthen
189. Choi, supra note 165, at 32.
190. Judgment of the Court of First Instance, October 25, 2002, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission of the
European Communities, T-5/02, and T-80/02, [hereinafter Tetra Laval/Sidel CFI].
191. Rebecca Pasler, Double Whammy for the Competition Commission, WORLD MARKET ANALYSIS,
Oct. 28, 2002; see also Francesco Guerrera, Court Scraps Monti Veto of Packaging Merger, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Oct. 25 2002.
192. Denis Staunton, Monti Promises to Overhaul EU Merger Policy After Series of Defeats, THE IRISH
TIMES, Oct. 26 2002.
193. Tetra Laval/Sidel, supra note 170, 6 (explaining that Tetra is a privately held company active in
design and manufacture of equipment, consumables and ancillary services for processing, packaging and
distribution of liquid food). Tetra is the world leader in traditional carton packaging and more limited involved
in plastic packaging. Id. Sidel involved in design and production of packaging equipment and systems, in
particular, blow moulding machinery, barrier technology and filing machines for polyethylene terephthalate
plastic bottles. Sidel is the worldwide leader for production and supply of blow-moulding machines. Id. at 7.
The Commission concluded that the notified concentration would create a dominant position in the market for
PET packaging equipment, and strengthen a dominant position in aseptic carton packaging equipment and
aseptic cartons in the EEA as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the
common market and in the EEA. The concentration was declared to be incompatible. Id.
194. Monti, supra note 98, at 5.
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the overall position of the merged entity on the market for sensitive product
packaging.
The court decided to prohibit leveraging if the Commission concluded that a
dominant position would be created or strengthened in the relatively near future
and would significantly impede effective competition on the market.'95 Therefore,
when the Commission assessed the effects of a conglomerate merger and relies
on foreseeable conduct, which in itself is likely to constitute abuse of an existing
dominant position, it is required to assess whether the illegal nature of conduct
and/or the risk of detection will make such a strategy unlikely. 96 If the
Commission's assessment is based on the possibility, or even the probability that
Tetra will engage in such conduct in the aseptic carton markets, its findings in
this respect cannot be upheld.' 97 Therefore, it is necessary to examine if there was
sufficiently convincing evidence 98 and whether the merged entity will have an
incentive to engage in leveraging practices.' 9  The Court found that the Commission
committed a manifest error of assessment. ° The conditions in Article 2(3) have not
201been fulfilled as foreseen by the Commission regarding leveraging.
As for the elimination of competition, the Court found that the Commission
had not sufficiently established that the merged entity would have less incentive
than Tetra currently has to innovate in the carton sector.0 2 The Commission had
not shown that the merged entity's position would be strengthened vis-A-vis its
competitors in the carton market.2 3
Lastly, as for the general strengthening effect of the merger, the Court
decided that since two pillars vitiated by manifest errors of assessment, the third
pillar must also be dismissed.' °  In sum, the court annulled the decision because
the contested decision did not establish to the requisite legal standard that the
modified merger would give rise to significant anticompetitive conglomerate
effects. °5
In essence, this case raised the burden of proof for the Commission. The
Commission must prove that companies can bundle products and that they have a
financial incentive to do so.20 6 Although the EU's standard of proof might change
in the future, the differences between the United States and the EU might remain.
195. Tetra Laval BV v. Commission of the European Communities (T5/02) CFII 153 (Oct. 25, 2002)











206. Pasler, supra note 191; see also Guerrera, supra note 191.
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The outcome of the GE/Honeywell decision will be decided on appeal at the
Court of First Instance.
3. Efficiencies
Another difference between the United States and the EU is the weight
placed on efficiencies both as a goal of merger, and differences in the analysis of
efficiency in merger. One has to discuss whether the different treatment of
efficiencies has been a factor in the different outcomes in Boeing and
GE/Honeywell cases. In the United States, it was not clear from the limited
information available whether efficiencies were considered, and thus whether
they played a role in the different outcomes in Boeing and GE/Honeywell. The
U.S. agencies presume efficiencies for all mergers unless there are clear and
demonstrable anticompetitive effects.
In the Boeing case, the main justification for the U.S.'s failure to challenge the
merger was that McDonnell Douglas was no longer an effective competitor. Hence,
efficiencies might not have been considered because the merger was not found to be
anticompetitive. However, in the media and the statements of the parties' presidents',
efficiencies and synergies between the commercial and defense airline industry were
important factors. Merger was seen as creating a better balance between defense and
commercial aircrafts. According to Stonecipher, the president of McDonnell
Douglas, the transaction created "a focused, broad-based aerospace company with
extraordinary capabilities in commercial and military aircraft, defense and space
systems." According to Condit, the president of Boeing Company, the merger would
be great for the airline industry, the nation's defense program, and for the space
program worldwide. 207
For the GE/Honeywell case, Charles James defended the agency's position
on the merger. He argued that after the agreed remedies, consumers would
benefit from the merger. He noted that the merged firm would offer better
products and services at lower prices than the firms could offer individually.2 8
Also, GE's former CEO Jack Welch claimed that GE expected to realize $1.5
billion in cost savings through the application of the best practices between GE's
management techniques and Honeywell's activities.09
Efficiency was barely discussed by the EU Commission, but in the little
discussion available the court approached efficiency differently. The EU saw
207. Boeing, McDonnell Douglas to Merge with Boeing, NEWS RELEASE (expressing optimism about the
merger deal), available at http://www.boeing.com/flash.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2004) (copy on file with The
Transnational Lawyer).
208. Antitrust & Trade Regulation Daily, July 6,2001; see also DOJ news release July 3,2001 supra note 83.
209. William J. Kolasky, GE/Honeywell: Continuing The Transatlantic Dialog, 23 U. PA J. INT'L ECON 513
(2002) (citing JACK WELCH & JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GuT (Warner Books 2001)). Combining
complementary assets and good management systems are a very important complementary asset-well recognized
source of merger specific efficiencies. Id. (citing Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Scale Economies and Synergies in
Horizontal Merger Analysis, 68 ANTrrRUST L.J. 685 (2001)).
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potential efficiencies and synergies as factors creating and strengthening a dominant
position. On the other hand, the GEiHoneywell case did not discuss efficiencies. Both
Commissioner Monti and Francisco-Enrique Gonzales, Head of the Merger Task
Force, DG Competition, stated that the parties did not claim any efficiencies.20 Thus,
there are differences in how both systems analyze efficiencies. The EU analyzes the
role of efficiency as a goal of antitrust, and the United States looks at the differences
in the efficiency defense.
a. Efficiency and Differences in Goals
The EU and the United States have different goals and policies with regard to
mergers, possibly explaining the different outcomes in these cases.2 ' For example,
they differ over whether non-efficiency goals should be considered. The ultimate
goal in the modem U.S. antitrust law system is consumer welfare, which has been
developed with case law, enforcement actions and guidelines. Promoting economic
efficiency is paramount.213 The United States finds it more probable than the EU that
210. Monti, supra note 98, at 5.
211. See, e.g., Stefan Schmitz, The European Commission's Decision in GE/Honeywell and the
Question of the Goals of Antitrust Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON L. 539, 540 (2002) (mentioning that this is a
battle between the Chicago and the Freiburg School of thought). The EU is concerned about the protection of
small and medium enterprises from dominant competitors, the EU system asks whether the merger will lead to
creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Id. This approach is similar to the early years of the U.S.
approach; he argues that the case would have similar outcome in the Warren Court in the 60s. Id. Now the
Chicago School of thought is dominant, where the exclusive goal of antitrust is maximizing consumer welfare,
and according to this thought consumer, welfare is nothing more than efficiency. Id. The United States puts
emphasis on efficiencies that increase consumer welfare. Id.; see also generally Stefan Schmitz, How Dare
They? European Merger Control and the European Commission's Blocking of the General Electric/Honeywell
Merger, 23 U. PA J. INT'L ECON L. 325 (2002).
212. See Eric S. Hochstadt, The Brown Shoe of European Union Competition Law, 24 CARDOZO L REV.
287, 319 (2002) (explaining that, by and large, consumer welfare has risen to the top of many competing goals
in the history of U.S. antitrust caselaw).
213. Antitrust Goes Global, What Future For Transatlantic Cooperation? P.60 (Simon J Evenett et al.
eds., 2000) (explaining there is broad consensus that the ultimate goal of competition is enhancement of
efficiency or almost equivalently maximization of consumer welfare.); Richard Posner, ANTITRUST LAW Chp. 2
(2d ed. 1976) (saying that there is no justification for using antitrust laws to attain goals unrelated to efficiency,
such as promoting a society of small tradesperson); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War
With Itself 17 (Basic Books Inc. 1978) (describing origins of major theory that drives evolution of antitrust in
1890 to 1914). In the early period the dominant goal was advancement of consumer welfare, but Justice
Brandeis gave weight to the conflicting goal of small business welfare. This goal became dominant, but not
exclusive goal in the era of Warren Court. Id.
... The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is maximization of consumer
welfare.... The responsibility of federal courts for the integrity and virtue of law requires that
they take consumer welfare as the sole value that guides antitrust decisions. Id. at 51. [Tihe
conventional indicia of legislative intent overwhelmingly support the conclusion that the
antitrust laws should be interpreted as designed for the sole purpose of forwarding consumer
welfare. Id. at 71.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law 1985 and Federal Antitrust Policy, The Law of
Competition and Its Practice, Chp. 2 (West 2d. ed., 1999) (determining the goals of antitrust is a tough job since
the statute language is vague, the legislative history is also not much help because it is ambiguous). See also,
Bork (there is dispute over the congressional interest, several discussions for the goal of antitrust: exclusively
with allocative efficiency; justice or fairness in business behavior; arrest welfare transfer away from consumers
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mergers will create efficiency gains and increase overall consumer 
wealth. 2 '4
However, in the EU, efficiency is not the only goal. The other objectives include
market integration and facilitating the entry of 
small firms into the market.
2'
I
Additionally, the EU Commission has broad responsibilities and considers other
policy concerns such as employment, trade, promoting harmonious development,
216
and economic expansion during both merger analysis and evaluation of dominance.
and toward price fixers and monopolists; protecting small firms. At some point Chicago School dominated,
preserving economic efficiency as the concern of the drafters of Sherman Act. Sherman, best case for efficiency
view, protects consumers from high prices and reduces output caused by monopoly and cartels. Clayton,
protection of small business, Celler Kefauer Amendment, depart from consumer welfare. Federal courts have
always interpreted antitrust statutes in common law fashion, substantial divergence between statutory language
and judicial decision. 1960s antitrust policy openly hostile toward innovation, large-scale development and
protector of right of small business to operate independently. Warren Court is effective at this term; mergers
were condemned because they created efficiencies in order to protect competitors of post merger firm. Later
Chicago School, role of economics in antitrust, economic efficiency the pursuit of which should be the
exclusive goal of antitrust laws. During the Reagan era, economic efficiency was the exclusive goal of antitrust
policy. Post-Chicago. Timothy J. Muris, GTE Sylvania and the Empirical Foundations of Antitrust 68 Antitrust
L.J. 899 (2001); see also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, supra note 209, at 911, "... Chicago School of
thought, later Sylvania Case-a milestone, firmly grounded antitrust on economic analysis." Although this was
not a merger case, the Court's implicit assumption that the economic welfare of consumers, rather than other
concerns was the appropriate objective of antitrust. The Reagan era, moved away from protecting small
competitors towards focus on consumer welfare. Schmidt supra note 211, at 548. Robert H. Lande, Proving the
Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to Protect Consumers, Not Just to Increase Efficiency, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. 65, 959 (1982) (in the 1980s the Chicago School was firmly in control of antitrust world). Bork a leading
Chicago School theorist explained antitrust goal with efficiency, but the primary concern of the Congress was
protecting consumers. Although the Congress had additional goals including economic efficiency, the
overriding concern was that consumers should not have to pay prices above competitive level. Id. at 962. See
also REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY, ESSAYS ON LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL
POLICY (Harry First, et al. ed.). SCHERER & ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, 3rd ed. 1998.
214. Stock, supra note 19, at 842.
215. Valentine Korah, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (7th ed. 2000)
(stating that in the EU there are also non-efficiency goals that mergers play a pivotal role in the pursuit of such
goals like market integration); Sarah Stevens, The Increased Aggression of the EC Commission in
Extraterritorial Enforcement of the Merger Regulation and Its Impact on Transatlantic Cooperation in
Antitrust, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 263, 266, 285 (2002); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Regulation
Across National Borders: The United States Boeing Versus the European Union of Airbus, 1/1/98 BROOKINGS
REV. 30, 1998 WL 10684773 (1998) (explaining that U.S. merger law is consumer oriented, and the inquiry is
whether the merger will make consumers worse off, as by raising the price of jets to the airlines). If McDonnell
Douglas was not a competitive force to be reckoned with, there was no antitrust problem. Id. at 266 EC law is
concerned not only with consumers, but also with unfair competitive advantages of dominant firms. Id. at 285
Thus, not everything turned on the prospects for Douglas. The cases are eclectic and contain hidden tensions. In
some cases, where a merger threatens no competitor, the decision may focus on efficient market competition
and consumer impact. In others, where competitors may be disadvantaged, the decision may postulate a
predatory scenario with the prospect that the dominant firm will squeeze out its competitors, and ultimately
charge monopoly prices to consumers. Id.
216. Kauper, supra note 26, at 319; Stock, supra note 19, at 831-841. Furthermore, there is also a
procedural difference in the EU. For instance, in the EU the final decision in the second phase is given by the
entire Comntission; not only the Commissioner in charge of competition but also the others who have
responsibilities in the European Community. It is likely that they would consider policies other than consumer
welfare and efficiency when making a decision. Kauper, supra note 26, at 319. According to Article 2 of the
Treaty of Rome, a treaty established the European Community. Treaty Establishing the European Community,
March 25, 1957, 298 UNTS 11,2 at Art. 2 available at http://eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc05.htm
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and
monetary union and by implementing the common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3
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In sum, the U.S. policy toward mergers presumes efficiency and the EU goals are
more general.
The EU focuses more on competitors, and the United States focuses on
consumer welfare and efficiency. This might explain the differences in efficiency
treatment. In the United States, the concern with mergers is that they will restrict
output and increase price. Hence, the United States will prevent anticompetitive
mergers that harm consumers by effecting price and quality.2 7 The United States
favors efficiencies that benefit consumers by reducing prices and achieving better
quality. On the other hand, the European Law is more concerned with ensuring a
level playing field by protecting competitors at the expense of efficiencies.2 8 As
seen in the Commission decisions, there are more discussions on the effect of
mergers on competitors and those factors which create and strength dominant
positions. Both the United States and the EU have significant substantive
differences in approach, such as divergence from a "consumer welfare and
efficiency" mold analysis with more emphasis on protecting competitors from
unfair competition." 9
b. Efficiency as a Defense in Merger Analysis
There are also some differences in the "efficiency defense" merger analysis
between the United States and the EU. The "efficiency defense" arises when
efficiencies would save an otherwise anticompetitive merger. Efficiencies are
considered either when assessing the likely effects of a merger or as an
affirmative defense to save an anticompetitive merger. Historically, in the United
States, efficiencies were disregarded or viewed negatively. This has changed in
recent years and the United States now considers efficiencies as a positive aspect
of mergers. However, U.S. courts usually find inadequate proof of efficiencies to
rebut the government's case of an anticompetitive merger.22 ° Consequently,
and 3a, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of
economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a
high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of
social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. Id.
217. Kolasky, supra note 131, at 546.
218. Douglas Melamed, International Antitrust in an Age of International Deregulation, 6 GEO MASON
L. REV. 437,444 (1998).
219. See also James Venit & William J. Kolasky, Substantive Convergence and Procedural Dissonance
in Merger Review, located in, ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL, supra note 213, at 85-86.
220. See, e.g., FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 63 (DDC 1998); U.S. v. Rockford Mem'l
Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. II. 1989); aff'd 898 F. 2d 1278 (7th Cir), cert. denied 498 U.S. 920 (1990); FTC
v. Heinz Co., 246 F. 3d 708; U.S. v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 938 F. Supp. 121 (ED N.Y. 1997)
(requiring strong evidence establishing the extent of the efficiencies and the need for the merger to achieve
them and show benefits to consumers).
... [A]ssuming that it is a viable defense, however, the Court cannot find in this case that the
defendants' efficiencies evidence rebuts the presumption that the merger may substantially
lessen competition or shows that the Commission's evidence gives an inaccurate prediction of
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efficiency defense has a very limited usage. 221 The Merger Guidelines also reflect
these changes.
c. Merger Guidelines
The 1968 Merger Guidelines considered efficiencies only in exceptional
circumstances. Efficiencies were treated as a defense to mergers that would
otherwise be challenged.2 2 According to the 1982 Merger Guidelines, efficiency
claims were only considered in extraordinary circumstances and as a defense or
mitigating factor if a merger would otherwise be challenged.
23 The 1984 Merger
Guidelines changed efficiencies, making them a factor to consider when
determining whether to challenge a merger. 4 The reason for this change was the
the proposed acquisition's probable effect. The Court agrees with the defendants that where, as
here, the merger has not yet been consummated, it is impossible to quantify precisely the
efficiencies that it will generate. In addition, the Court recognizes a difference between
efficiencies, which are merely speculative, and those, which are based on, a prediction backed
by sound business judgment. Nor does the Court believe that the defendants must prove their
efficiencies by "clear and convincing evidence" in order for those efficiencies to be considered
by the Court. That would saddle Section 7 defendants with the nearly impossible task of
rebutting a possibility with a certainty, a burden, which was, rejected in U.S. v. Baker Hughes
Inc., 908 F 2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Instead, like all rebuttal evidence in Section 7 cases,
the defendants must simply rebut the presumption that the merger will substantially lessen
competition by showing that the Commission's evidence gives an inaccurate prediction of the
proposed acquisition's probable effect. Defendants, however, must do this with credible
evidence, and the Court with respect to this issue did not find the defendants' evidence to be
credible.... In addition, the defendants argued that the merger would also generate dynamic
efficiencies ... the Court finds, based primarily on testimony, that the defendants' cost savings
estimates are unreliable. The Court cannot find that the defendants have rebutted the
presumption that the merger will substantially lessen competition by showing that, because of
the efficiencies, which will result from the merger, the Commission's evidence gives an
inaccurate prediction of the proposed acquisition's probable effect. Therefore, the only
remaining issue for the Court is the balancing of the equities.
FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp 1066, 1088 (D.D.C. 1997).
221. Robert M. Vemail, One Step Forward, One Step Back: How the Pass-On Requirement for
Efficiencies Benefits in the FTC v. Staples Undermines the Revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
Efficiencies Section, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 133 (1998). HERBERT HOVENKAMP, supra note 213, at 12.2.a. As
also discussed in the efficiency as goal of antitrust part, many argued that the Supreme Court before 1980s were
protectionist and relied on populist goal of Congress and efficiencies were not considered or less value, they cite
to Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) and Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). Later, efficiency
became the concern of antitrust.
222. FrC Staff Report, Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the new High-tech, Global
Marketplace, Chapter 2, p 8-9 (May 1996) available at www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc-vl.pdf (last visited
Oct. 4, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter 21st Century FTC Staff Report].
Merger Guidelines, supra note 156, year 1968. Efficiencies were then referred to as economies. Id.
223. 21st Century FFC Staff Report, supra note 222, Chp. 2 at 9; Merger Guidelines, supra note 156,
year 1982.
224. 21st Century FrC Staff Report, supra note 222, Chp. 2 at 10. Merger Guidelines, supra note 156,
at year 1984, fn 56, p.
1 4 . Large portion of testimony supported the idea that efficiencies should be evaluated as
part of the analysis of merger's likely competitive effects rather than an absolute defense. Also some testimony
supported viewing efficiencies an affirmative defense. Merger Guidelines, supra note 156, at year 1984, fn 66,
p. 16.
2004 / Differences in Merger Analysis
notion that the primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their efficiency
enhancing potential. Thus, in a majority of cases firms would be allowed to
achieve available efficiencies without Department interference. 25 The 1992
Merger Guidelines were substantially similar to the 1984 Merger Guidelines.226
Lastly, the Merger Guidelines were revised in 1997, to clarify the role of
efficiency and broaden circumstances where it will be considered. According to
the Merger Guidelines, mergers can generate significant efficiencies by
permitting a better utilization of existing assets. This enables the combined firm
to achieve lower costs in producing a given quality and quantity than either firm
could have achieved without the proposed transaction. 227 Efficiencies are part of a
direct competitive effects analysis.22' But, according to the latest Merger
Guidelines, efficiencies are relevant, only if they are merger specific, have been
verified, and do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service.
Merger specific "efficiencies" are ones that are unlikely to be achieved in the
absence of either the proposed merger or another means with comparable
anticompetitive effects. 229 The United States presumes that mergers create
efficiencies, and this is reflected in its policy toward mergers. On the other hand,
the efficiency defense is limited for mergers that have anticompetitive effects.
d. United States Cases
The U.S. approach is not clear from history. Three Supreme Court cases
mention efficiencies: Brown Shoe, Philadelphia National Bank and FTC v.
Procter & Gamble. Some commentators argue the Supreme Court decisions
during the mid 1960s considered efficiencies as an adverse factor in assessing
legality of mergers, and thus condemned some mergers.230 However, some argue
that these cases did not reject the efficiency defense. First, in Brown Shoe, Brown
225. 21st Century FTC Staff Report 2, supra note 222, Chp. 2 at 10; Merger Guidelines, supra note 156,
year 1984.
226. Merger Guidelines, supra note 156, year 1984 § 11, (omitting the express requirement that
efficiencies be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
227. Merger Guidelines, supra note 157 § 4.
228. 21st Century FTC Staff Report, supra note 222.
229. See FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F 3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999).
230. Arguments that the court was protectionist and the decisions were "populist antitrust" and the court
did not give value to efficiencies. Mark N. Berry, Efficiencies and Horizontal Mergers: In Search of a Defense,
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 515, 521 (1996); Kauper, supra note 26, at 352; Pierre Emmanuel Noel, Efficiency
Considerations in the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under European and U.S. Antitrust Law, 18 EUR
COMPETITION L. REV. 498-519 (1997); HOVENKAMP, supra note 213, at 499. Brown Shoe, Von's Grocery-
protecting small business. They mostly refer to FTC v. Procter & Gamble, arguing that the Supreme Court
refused to recognize possible economies as a defense to an otherwise unlawful merger. But, some commentators
argue the opposite that this was not rejection of efficiency defense. The Efficiency Defence and the European
System of Merger Control, European Economy, Reports and Studies No. 5 at 77 (2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comn/economy-finance/publications/european-economy/reportsandstudiesO5O l-en.htm
(last visited Oct. 4, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) [hereinafter EFFICIENCY DEFENCE AND
THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF MERGER CONTROL].
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Shoe Company did not raise efficiency considerations as justifications. 3' The
Court acknowledged the benefits to consumers, but focused on Congress' desire
to promote competition through protection of small, locally owned businesses
and resolved the competing considerations in favor of decentralization. 32
In Philadelphia National Bank, the second Supreme Court decision, the
parties presented three affirmative justifications, one of which arguably involved
efficiency. 33 The banks argued that Philadelphia needed a larger bank than it had
231. Berry, supra note 230, at 522.
232. 370 U.S. 294 at 344.
... The retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating wholesalers and by increasing
the volume of purchases from the manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their
own brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers. Of course, some of the
results of large integrated or chain operations are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is
not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely
affected. It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to
recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small,
locally owned business. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these
competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We must give effect to that decision.
Other factors to be considered in evaluating the probable effects of a merger in the relevant
market lend additional support to the District Court's conclusion that this merger may
substantially lessen competition. One such factor is the history of tendency toward
concentration in the industry. Id.
233. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370, 83 S. Ct. 1715, 1745 (1963).
... We turn now to three affirmative justifications, which appellees offer for the proposed
merger. The first is that only through mergers can banks follow their customers to the suburbs
and retain their business. This justification does not seem particularly related to the instant
merger, but in any event it has no merit.... Second, it is suggested that the increased lending
limit of the resulting bank will enable it to compete with the large out-of-state bank,
particularly the New York banks, for very large loans. We reject this application of the
concept of 'countervailing power. If anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified
by procompetitive consequences in another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an
industry could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would make it in the
end as large as the industry leader. For if all the commercial banks in the Philadelphia area
merged into one, it would be smaller than the largest bank in New York City. This is not a
case, plainly, where two small firms in a market propose to merge in order to be able to
compete more successfully with the leading firms in that market. Id. Nor is it a case in which
lack of adequate banking facilities is causing hardships to individuals or businesses in the
community .... This brings us to appellees' final contention, that Philadelphia needs a bank
larger than it now has in order to bring business to the area and stimulate its economic
development. We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially
to lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or
economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A value choice of such magnitude
is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence, and in any event has been made for U.S.
already, by Congress when it enacted the amended § 7. Congress determined to preserve our
traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the
benign and the malignant alike, fully aware, we must assume, that some price might have to
be paid. In holding as we do that the merger of appellees would violate s 7 and must therefore
be enjoined, we reject appellees' pervasive suggestion that application of the procompetitive
policy of § 7 to the banking industry will have dire, although unspecified, consequences for
the national economy. Concededly, PNB and Girard are healthy and strong; they are not
undercapitalized or over loaned; they have no management problems; the Philadelphia area is
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to bring business to the area and stimulate economic development. The Court
rejected this argument, stating that making itself larger to attract more customers
was not an efficiency argument. However, the Court's rejection of the argument
was not related to the notion that the merger would lower costs or create
efficiencies. Also, the banks' argument about achievement of economies of scale
was not mentioned by the District Court so it was considered abandoned on
appeal. The Supreme Court was not asked to consider whether such a benefit to
the community would justify an otherwise illegal merger.3
Finally, in FTC v. Procter & Gamble, the Supreme Court rejected an
efficiency defense argument and held that a potential economic efficiency cannot
be used as a defense to illegality.235
During the 1980s-1990s, the lower courts started considering potential
efficiencies in evaluating the legality of a merger. 36 However, although
efficiency arguments were used in approving consent decrees, there has not been
a U.S. court decision to date that relied on efficiency in rejecting a challenge to
an otherwise illegal merger.237 A number of cases can be looked at to illustrate
how courts in the United States consider efficiencies in mergers and the
efficiency defense. For instance, as discussed in the FTC v. Staples case, there is
uncertainty with the efficiency defense:
[w]hether an efficiencies defense showing that the intended merger would
create significant efficiencies in the relevant market, thereby offsetting any
anti-competitive effects, may be used by a defendant to rebut the
government's prima facie case is not entirely clear. The newly revised
efficiencies section of the Merger Guidelines recognizes that, "mergers have
the potential to generate significant efficiencies by permitting a better
utilization of existing assets, enabling the combined firm to achieve lower
costs in producing a given quality and quantity than either firm could have
achieved without the proposed transaction." See Merger Guidelines § 4.
This coincides with the view of some courts that "whether an acquisition
not over banked; ruinous competition is not in the offing. Section 7 does not mandate
cutthroat competition in the banking industry, and does not exclude defenses based on
dangers to liquidity or solvency, if to avert them a merger is necessary. Id. at 371-372.
234. Id. at 334-35, n. 10. "Appellees offered testimony that the merger would enable certain economies
of scale, specifically; that it would enable the formation of a more elaborate foreign department than either bank
is presently able to maintain. But this attempted justification, which was not mentioned by the District Court in
its opinion and has not been developed with any fullness before this Court, we consider abandoned." Id.
235. Id. at 380. Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that
some mergers, which lessen competition, may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of
protecting competition. See Brown Shoe.
236. See, e.g., ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 236, at 347, n.187: FTC v. Tenet Health Care
Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054-55 (8th Cir 1999); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 63 (DDC
1998); FTC v. Alliant Techsystems Inc., 808 F. Supp. 9, 21 (DDC 1992); U.S. v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F.
Supp. 1251 (N.D. I11. 1989); affd 898 F. 2d 1278 (7th Cir), cert. denied 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
237. For a list of consent decrees permitting transactions on efficiency arguments see id. at 347, n. 189.
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would yield significant efficiencies in the relevant market is an important
consideration in predicting whether the acquisition would substantially
lessen competition.... [T]herefore.... an efficiency defense to the
government's prima facie case in section 7 challenges is appropriate in
certain circumstances. FTC v. University Health, 938 F 2d 1206, 1222 (11 th
Cir. 1991). However, in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, the
Supreme Court stated that "[p]ossible economics cannot be used as a
defense to illegality in section 7 merger cases." There has been great
disagreement regarding the meaning of this precedent and whether an
efficiencies defense is permitted.
231
In some cases, courts have rejected the efficiency defense but found it
acceptable to consider efficiencies as a part of the analysis.239 For example, in
FTC v. University Health, the court considered efficiencies as part of the analysis
but rejected the notion that efficiencies constitute a defense to an anticompetitive
merger.2'" According to the court, ".... in certain circumstances, a defendant may
rebut the government's prima facie case with evidence showing that the intended
merger would create significant efficiencies in the relevant market. 2 '
In a few cases, courts have accepted the efficiency defense, but found
insufficient proof. In FTC v. H J Heinz Co.,242 the U.S. Court of Appeals found
that the parties failed to produce sufficient evidence to rebut the inference of an
anticompetitive effect. The court stated that, when there is a potential for high
concentration in the market, extraordinary efficiencies are required before a
merger can be justified. The court also found the alleged efficiencies were not
sufficient to meet this standard when measured against the combined entity's
total output and cost structure.2 3 It is clear from this case that if a party is
238. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066. 1088 (D.D.C., 1997).
239. See FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 63 (D.D.C., 1998); U.S. v. Rockford Mem'l
Corp, 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. II1., 1989), aff'd 898 F. 2d 1278 (7th Cir), cert. denied 498 U.S. 920 (1990);
FrC v. Heinz Co., 246 F. 3d 708; U.S. v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 938 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
from ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 220, at 347 n.187.
240. Pitofsky, supra note 29. Of course, once it is determined that a merger would substantially lessen
competition, expected economies, however great, will not insulate the merger from a section 7 challenge." Id.
See Clorox, 386 U.S. at 579, 87 S. Ct at 1231 ("Congress was aware [when it enacted section 7] that some
mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting
competition."); Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 371 ("Congress determined to preserve our traditionally
competitive economy. It therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully
aware, we must assume, that some price might have to be paid.").
241. FTC v. University Health, 938 F. 2d 1206, 1222 (11 th Cir 1991); Craig W. Conrath & Nicholas A.
Widnell, Efficiency Claims in Merger Analysis: Hostility or Humility? 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 685 (1999).
242. FTC v. H J Heinz Co, 246 F. 3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
243. See FTC v University Health Inc, 938 F. 2d 1206, 1223 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (accepting efficiencies as
being useful in evaluating the ultimate issue, the overall effect on competition, that the parties did not presented
sufficient evidence to support efficiency claims. Id. The case recognizes the existence of an efficiency defense.
"... [W]e conclude that in certain circumstances, a defendant may create significant efficiencies in the relevant
market .... but the appellees have failed to demonstrate that their transaction would yield any efficiencies." Id.
at 1221.
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claiming efficiencies, there is a heavy burden to show that there are merger
specific efficiencies that will maintain prices and output at pre-merger levels or
better.
In sum, there is no case to date where an affirmative efficiency defense saved
an otherwise anticompetitive merger. Efficiencies are considered in evaluating a
merger, but the efficiency defense is very limited and has not saved an
anticompetitive merger."
e. European Union Cases
Efficiency has not played an important role in clearing mergers in the EU or
in the evaluation of mergers.4 5 Some commentators argue that due to the separate
condition that technical and economic progress resulting from a merger should
not form an obstacle to competition, it is almost impossible to accept an
efficiency defense since any improvement of a merged entity's efficiency is
likely to enhance market power.246 There is no efficiency defense provision in the
Merger Regulation, but the efficiency argument fits under Article 2(l)(b) of the
Merger Regulation. In Article 2(l)(b), the Commission considers whether the
merger will result in the development of technical and economic progress that is
247to the consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.
The Havilland case was one of the first EU cases to analyze the "development of
technical and economic progress." In Havilland, the Commission considered a
variety of efficiencies and did not find the "development of technical and economic
progress" criteria satisfied to counteract the creation or strengthening of a dominant
position.248 The decision implied that most efficiency arguments would be unavailing
244. But see FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp and Blodgett Memorial Medical Center , 946 F. Supp.
1285, 1300-1301 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd 121 F. 3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997), unpublished opinion (explaining that
the merger would result in significant efficiencies, which are sufficient to offset the anticompetitive competitive
effects). See also Peter D. Camesasca, The Explicit Efficiency Defence In Merger Control: Does It Make the
Difference, EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 20(1), 14-28 (1999); see also EFFICIENCY DEFENCE AND THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF MERGER CONTROL, supra note 230, at § 2, 16.
245. Thomas L. Greaney, Not for Import: Why the EU Should Not Adopt the American Efficiency
Defense for Analyzing Mergers and Joint Ventures, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 871,889 (2000).
246. EFFICIENCY DEFENCE AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF MERGER CONTROL, supra note 230, at § 2,
14-17 (comparing the legislation and current practice in the EU, the USA and Canada).
247. There are some changes in the EU. For instance, there is a Commission Notice on the appraisal of
horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings. See
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between undertakings (Brussels)
11.12.2002 COM (2002) 711 final, 2002/0296 (CNS), available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/com
pdf/2002/com2002_0711en.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2004) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer)
[hereinafter Proposal for a Council Regulation]. There are changes in the efficiency considerations; this will be
discussed in the convergence part. Id.
248. Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland Case IV/M 053, i 65-69, IV/M053 1991. (declaring that the
merger would not contribute to the development of technical and economic progress within the meaning of
Article 2(1), but added that even if there were such progress, this would not be to consumers' advantage, the
consumers will be faced with a dominant position which combines the post popular aircraft families on the
market, choice will be significantly reduced).
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given a finding of dominance.2 49 The EU considers technical and economic progress
primarily as evidence of a strengthening, dominant position.25° Synergies and
efficiencies that the merger might produce are seen as negative and as a potential
source of dominance in the EU.25' For example, in the AT&T/NCR case, possible
synergies between merging parties were considered as potentially creating or
strengthening a dominant position.2 ' The Commission interpreted the provision to
take into account economic efficiency in borderline cases, but not if a clear dominant
position would result."3
The Commission clearly expressed its position in Danish Crown/Vestjyske
Slagterier25 . Under Article 2(1)b of the Merger Regulation, the Commission may
take into account the development of technical and economic progress only to the
extent that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to
competition. Therefore, the creation of a dominant position in the relevant
1
249. Id. 891 citing Christopher Jones & F. Enrique Gonzales-Diaz, The EEL Merger Regulation, 153-
158 (1992); Frederic Jenny, EEC Merger Control: Economies as an Antitrust Defense or an Antitrust Attack?,
1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 591, 602 (Barry Hawk ed 1993).
, .. [I]n short, beside ignoring the most important productive efficiency gains in examining
the ATR/de Havilland merger (while at the same time putting heavy emphasis on the fact that
those gains may lead to a strengthening of the dominant position of the firms by enabling
them to strengthen their customer base), the Commission declares expeditiously and
somewhat arbitrarily that the manufacturing cost savings for parties are insignificant....
250. Thomas E. Kauper, supra note 26, at 356.
251. Peter D. Camesasca, The Explicit Efficiency Defence in Merger Control: Does It Make the
Difference, 20 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 14 (1999) (explaining that the wording of the Merger Regulation
does not leave scope for taking dynamic efficiencies into account once dominance is concluded upon).
252. AT&T/NCR, IV/M 050 (1991) at 30 (arguing, "it is not excluded that potential advantages flowing
from synergies may create or strengthen a dominant position."). Frederic Jenny, supra note 249, at 591, 596-97.
The reasoning here if merger is likely to lead to innovations which competitors have not been
able to achieve, then there is prima facie case that the merger should be blocked because, by
giving advantage to the firms involved, the innovation is likely to lead to the creation of a
dominant position as innovation is likely to lead to creation of a dominant position as a result
of which competition will be impeded ... there is no efficiency defense but an efficiency
attack.
Id.
See also EFFICIENCY DEFENCE AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF MERGER CONTROL, supra note 230, at
§ 2, 14-17. (comparing the legislation and current practice in the EU, the USA and Canada). Also looking at the
efficiency defense in practice. Id. at 81.
253. Edume Nvon, Andres Font Glrza, Jaime Folguera Crespo, Jun Briones Alonso, MERGER CONTROL
IN THE EU, LAW, ECONOMICS AND PRACTICE, at 315 (Oxford University Press 2002); European Economy,
European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, The Efficiency Defense and
the European System of Merger Control, No 5, 2001, Part 5, Efficiency Defense in Practice, p.81 referring to
European Commission (1996). No efficiency defense where there is clear market dominance: European
Economy, European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, The Efficiency
defense and the European System of Merger Control, No 5, 2001. Part 2, a comparison of legislation and
current practice in the EU, the USA and Canada, p. 15 MSG/Media Services, IV/M 469 (1994), the transaction
would involve significant efficiencies, however it would result in dominant position that would hinder
competition. See also Thomas L. Greaney, supra note 245, at 891 (explaining that in a number of cases the
Commission has used the findings of enhancement of efficiencies to bolster its conclusion that the merger will
create or increase market dominance; for example MSG/Media Services or Du Pont/ICl, IV/M 214 (1992)).
254. Danish Crown/Vestijske Slagterier, 2000/42/EC March 9th 1999 (OJ L 20, 25.1.2000).
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markets identified above means that the efficiencies argument put forward by the
parties cannot be considered in the assessment of the present merger.255
In conclusion, the EU will consider efficiencies as part of the overall
assessment to determine whether a merger creates or strengthens a dominant
position, but not to justify dominance. 256 Once a dominant position is created or
strengthened, there is no practical scope for an efficiency defense.257
f Efficiency Consideration to Challenge or Not to Challenge a Merger
The United States assumes efficiency as the most likely explanation for a
merger and rejects anticompetitive potential unless it is clear. In the United
States, efficiency is the primary explanation for mergers. The United States has a
more positive approach to efficiencies and it is part of the competitive effects
analysis.25 The positive approach of the United States might be a result of the
United States' focus on consumers. In addition, efficiencies can lower prices and
increase quality, thus benefiting consumers. The United States attributes more
weight to plausible short-term benefits, and there is also more confidence in
competitors, customers, and suppliers in the United States."9
While the United States explicitly acknowledges efficiencies, the EU, in
contrast, is more skeptical about efficiencies. This most likely results from its
260focus on competitors, or its focus on single firm dominance. Potential
efficiencies and synergies are factors contributing to dominant position.16' For
255. EFFICIENCY DEFENCE AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF MERGER CONTROL, supra note 230, at § 2, 15
(comparing the legislation and current practice in the EU, the USA and Canada).
256. EFFICIENCY DEFENCE AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF MERGER CONTROL, supra note 230, at 80
(referring to European Commission (1996)): "... . there is no real legal possibility of justifying an efficiency defense
under the Merger Regulation, any efficiency issues are considered in the overall assessment to determine whether
dominance has been created or strengthened and not to justify or mitigate that dominance in order to clear a
concentration which otherwise be prohibited," Id.
257. Id. at § 2, 15 (comparing the legislation and current practice in the EU, the USA and Canada).
258. Sliding scale approach, greater efficiency as the anticompetitive effects increase. Could not be
achieved in a less anticompetitive way.
259. Interview with Timothy Muris Chairman of the FrC, 16 ANTITRUST 55 (2001); Timothy Muris,
Merger Enforcement In a World of Multiple Arbiters, before Brookings Institution Roundtable on Trade and
Investment Policy, Washington, D.C., December 21, 2002: (explaining that the U.S. gives more weight to short
term benefits, greater confidence in ability of competitors, customers and suppliers). The DOJ did not want to
sacrifice likely benefits for longer-term. Id. The DOJ concluded that it made more sense to approve and later
challenge unlawful conduct if they occur. Id. The EU is more inclined than U.S. to give credence to concern
over potential long-term harm that could arise from range effects of a merger. Id.; see Proposal for a Council
Regulation, supra note 247, 52 (explaining that on the substantive side, the Green paper sought to launch
debate on policy questions). It proposed to review and if necessary, clarify the role in merger investigations of
efficiency claims made by merging parties. Id. In 59-60. The Commission is of the opinion that it is legally
possible to deal explicitly with the issue of efficiencies under the present substantive test and the present
wording of the Merger Regulation, Article 2(1) b "the development of technical and economic progress
provided it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition". Id.
260. Greney, supra note 245, at 892 (arguing that mergers enhancing oligopolistic market may arise
different efficiencies).
261. The Commission's interpretation clearly expressed in its decision Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier,
where it said "... The creation of a dominant position in the relevant markets identified above, therefore, means
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example, the EU blocked the GE/Honeywell merger because vertical integration
would foreclose competition, and as a result, the merger would create and
strengthen a dominant position on the markets for large commercial aircraft
engines, large regional jet aircraft engines, corporate jet engines, and markets for
avionics and non-avionics products. Honeywell's access to cheaper capital from
GE enabled it to invest more than its rivals in developing better and discounted
products. The Commission viewed this factor as one creating or strengthening a
dominant position negatively affecting competitors, potentially driving rivals
from the market, raising prices and ultimately harming consumers.2 62 The EU did
not find enough countervailing power, either from competitors or buying power,
to approve the merger.
In the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case, the EU's concern was that Boeing
would have large sales by combining military and commercial sides, and this
would increase resources, technology, and R&D. The practical result of this is
that Boeing's dominance would eventually be strengthened, thus foreclosing
•• 261
competition. In addition, the EU viewed exclusive dealing agreements and the
complementary products of McDonnell Douglas as leading to dominant market
power and considered them as negative factors.
In the United States, efficiencies were not discussed in connection with either
merger, probably because the United States presumes efficiency for all mergers,
unless there is clear and demonstrable anticompetitive effect. Commentators
discussing the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger viewed the synergies between
the commercial and defense sector, the balance between commercial and military
work, and the increase in capacity and flexibility as welfare enhancing effects.
2t 6
The merger was considered beneficial, increasing capacity and flexibility due to
efficiencies between military and commercial sectors.26 ' The factors seen as
having a conglomerate effect in the EU might have been seen as efficiencies in
the United States, where the concept of efficiency is broader.26
that the efficiencies argument put forward by the parties cannot be taken into account in the assessment of the
present merger." Council Directive 2000/42/EC, 1999 O.J. (L20) 25.1.2000). So if they are creating a dominant
position, then efficiencies cannot be taken into account. Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland Case IV/M 053, at 65-
69, IV/M053 1991, AT&T/NCR IV/M 050 (1991) at 30, MSG/Media Services, IV/M 469 (1994), Du Pont/ICI,
IV/M 214 (1992). see also Greaney, supra note 245.
262. See William J. Kolasky, supra note 131; William Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Speech, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, U.S. and European Competition Policy: Are There More
Differences Than We Care to Admit? Before the European Policy Center, Belgium, April 10, 2002; Hochstadt,
supra note 212, at 319; EFFICIENCY DEFENCE AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF MERGER CONTROL, supra note 230,
at § 2, 14-17 (comparing the legislation and current practice in the EU, the USA and Canada).
263. However, the merger was eventually approved. See Stock, supra note 19 (explaining that efficiencies
were not mentioned in the FrC Report the differing U.S. and EU positions on the Boeing/ McDonnell Merger).
This might be because the merger raised no concerns so no need to mention them, or even if concerns according to
the sliding scale analysis-the efficiencies outweighed the anticompetitive concerns. But the merger was approved
because McDonnell Douglas was no longer a meaningful competitive force. Id.
264. William E. Kovacic, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and
International Competition Policy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 805, 856-57 (2001); Kolasky, supra note 131.
265. Greaney, supra note 245, at 891.
266. The United States presumes mergers create efficiencies. According to the Merger Guidelines primary
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g. Efficiency as an Affirmative Defense
For GE/Honeywell and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, there might be
differences in the efficiency defense analysis. However, the shortcoming for this
comparison is that, in the United States, there is hardly any public information
available unless the merger is litigated. It is harder to evaluate the U.S. analysis
because the information is confidential. For example, in the United States,
GE/Honeywell proponents were unable to prove efficiencies in the merger that
would lead to better and cheaper products. The efficiencies were only assertions.
Since the information is confidential, the public does not know the details
regarding the asserted efficiencies. Therefore, the efficiencies remain unknown;
there could be merger specific, cognizable efficiencies under the Merger
Guidelines. However, there is no information available to determine why the
merger was necessary, or why coordination, joint venture or bilateral agreements
would not have been sufficient. It is impossible to know whether the efficiency
arguments, if any, would have been accepted in court. According to the case law
in the United States, one might conclude that, if these cases were litigated, the
efficiencies would not have saved an otherwise anticompetitive merger, given the
skepticism in the United States about the efficiency defense. As recently
discussed in FTC v. H J Heinz Co., if a party is claiming efficiencies, there is a
heavy burden to show that they are merger specific efficiencies that will maintain
prices and output at pre-merger levels or better.
Nevertheless, although not clear about its efficiency arguments, the United
States criticized the EU Commission for condemning mergers leading to lower
prices, more attractive products and services, merger specific cost savings, and
for turning the efficiency defense into an efficiency offense, especially in the
267GE/Honeywell case.
However, Commissioner Mario Monti rejected the assertion that the European
Commission applies an efficiency offense when dealing with conglomerate
mergers.2 6 ' There is a distinction between mergers that lead to price reductions as a
result of strategic behavior of dominant firms to eliminate competitors and exploit
consumers, and mergers that objectively lead to significant and durable efficiency
gains that are likely to be passed to the consumers. 269 According to CommissionerMonti, desirable efficiencies are aimed at long-term and structural reduction in the
benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate efficiencies. Things considered as entrenchment in EU
might have been called efficiencies under the U.S. antitrust policy and might have weighed in favor of transaction,
exclusive dealing, military and commercial synergies. Robert Pitofsky, Vertical Restraints and Vertical Aspects of
Merger A U.S. Perspective, FORDHAM CORP L INST (1998) (Barry Hawk ed. 1998); Kovacic, supra note 264, at 805,
847, 853 available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pit l.htm
267. CRA Insights, supra note 171, at 5 (concluding, that the EC policy condemns mergers leading to lower
prices, more attractive products and services, or merger specific, cognizable cost savings). See also Jenny, supra note
249, at 591; Roundtable Discussion, Transatlantic Antitrust: Convergence or Divergence?, 16 ANTrrRUST 9 (2001).
268. Monti, supra note 98 (admitting "conglomerate mergers might have the potential to generate
efficiency gains").
269. Id.
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marginal cost of production and distribution. They are the direct and immediate
result of the merger and cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. Moreover, it
must be reasonably likely that the efficiencies will be passed on to the consumer on a
permanent basis, in terms of lower prices or increased quality.27°
Commissioner Monti argued that in the GE/Honeywell case the merging
parties did not prove efficiencies, and it is harder for the antitrust authority to
clear a transaction that is likely to lead to foreclosure effects. Commissioner
Monti asserts that there is no difference between the way the United States and
EU Commission apply the "Efficiency Defense." Moreover, there is convergence
between the two systems on efficiencies and efficiency defense criteria.
h. Convergence
In the EU, there is a positive attitude toward efficiency claims since the
Havilland case. The EU is again reviewing its efficiency approach and intends to
view efficiencies more favorably and integrate efficiency analysis into competitive
effects analysis under its revision of the Merger Regulation. 7' According to the
revisions, efficiencies will only be accepted when there is sufficient confidence that
the efficiencies will encourage the merged entity to act competitively for the benefit
of consumers and when efficiencies outweigh the adverse effects on consumers or
make adverse effects unlikely. There is also a Draft Commission Notice ('Notice")
on the appraisal of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of
concentrations between undertakings.272 The efficiency part is similar to the U.S.
Merger Guidelines. According to this Notice.
The Commission considers any substantial efficiency claim in the overall
assessment of the merger. It may decide that, as a consequence of the
270. Monti, supra note 98; see also Mario Monti, The future for Competition Policy in the EU,
Merchant Taylor's Hall, London (July 9, 2001) Merger Control: Issues highlighted in the context of the
GR/Honeywell Merger. available at http://europa.eu.int/conm/competition/speeches/index-speeches -by-the_
commissioner.html (commenting, "We are not against mergers that create more efficient firms. Such mergers
tend to benefit consumers, even if competitors might suffer from increased competition). We are, however,
against mergers that, without creating efficiencies, could raise barriers for competitors and lead eventually to
reduced consumer welfare." Id.
271. Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation EEC No 4064/89 11.12.2001 Com (2001) 745/6
Final, at 170-72 (opening with discussion on to what extent efficiencies might be taken into consideration)
[hereinafter Green Paper]; see also The Competitive Effects of Efficiencies in European Merger Control,
Enterprise Papers No 11 (2002), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/others/. The Commission
acknowledged that it is legally possible to deal explicitly with the issue of efficiencies under the present
substantive test and with the present and proposed wording of the Merger Regulation. Also covered under the
proposed horizontal merger guidelines. Id.
272. Commission Notice, the appraisal of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the
control of concentrations between undertakings, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels
11.12.2002, COM (2002) 2 (stating that "[t]he purpose of this notice to provide guidance as to how the
Commission makes the appraisal of concentrations where the undertakings concerned are active sellers on the
same relevant market or potential competitors on that market") [hereinafter EU Notice on mergers].
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efficiencies that the merger brings about, this merger does not create or
strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition
would be significantly impeded. This will be the case when the
Commission is in a position to conclude on the basis of sufficient
evidence that the efficiencies generated by the merger are likely to
enhance the incentive of the merged entity to act pro-competitively for
the benefit of consumers, by counteracting the effects on competition
which the merger might otherwise have. In the interest of the consumer,
it is necessary to ensure that the merged firm will have sufficient
incentives not only to realise efficiencies arising directly from the merger
but also to make continuing efforts to enhance efficiency. This
presupposes sufficient competitive pressure from the remaining firms
and from potential entry.71
The Notice also requires the efficiencies to be substantial, to the direct
benefit of consumers, merger specific and verifiable. 4
V. CONCLUSION
Although it is more common to have similar results in the same mergers and
275there is convergence in the area. There are still cases in which the EU and the
United States reach different conclusions when analyzing the same merger. For
example, in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case, the EU found the proposed
merger anticompetitive and only approved it after several concessions were
made. In contrast, the United States approved the same merger without concern.
Similarly, in the GE/Honeywell merger, the EU found the merger incompatible
and did not approve it, while the United States did. Some of the differences
between the two systems can be grouped as follows. First, there is a difference in
focus between the two. The EU looks at the effect of the merger on competitors
273. EU Notice on Mergers, supra note 272, 88.
274. Id. 189.
Efficiencies are most likely to make a difference when they are substantial and the possible
anti -competitive effects that might otherwise occur are small ... greater the possible negative
effects on competition, the more the Commission has to be sure that the claimed efficiencies
are substantial, likely to be realised, and to the direct benefit of the consumer.... efficiencies
have to be of direct benefit to consumers and to be merger-specific, substantial, timely, and
verifiable. Id. at 90 . .. efficiencies should directly benefit consumers in the relevant markets
where it is otherwise likely that a dominant position will be created or strengthened as a result
of which conditions of effective competition would be significantly impeded.... Id. at 91.
Also, efficiencies that lead to a new or improved products or services may directly benefit
consumers. Id. at 92. Merger specific. Id. at 93 verifiable. Id. at 94.
See also Mario Monti, Radical Reform European Commission, IBA Conference on EU Merger Control
Brussels, 7 November 2002; see also EU Notice on Mergers, supra note 272.
275. Monti, supra note 98 (stating that substantive convergence is seen in the following recent cases
with similar outcomes and remedies: MCI/Sprint (M 1741 (2000)), Alcoa/Reynolds (M 1693 (2000)),
Exxon/Mobil (M 1383 (1999)).
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and the United States focuses on consumers. Next, the EU focuses more on
single firm dominance versus the U.S.' approach that concentrates on oligopoly
and collusion.276 Another category encompasses differences in conglomerate
effects and efficiencies. Other differences might arise as a result of differences in
process and procedure. Finally, the two consider the innovation market analysis
differently.
276. Id. However, EU's analysis is similar to the U.S.'s in collective or oligopolistic dominance-fear of
coordinated interaction. Similar examination is coordination likely, post merger market conditions, market
specific factors-homogeneity, market transparency etc. But not that common, potential issues of collective
dominance, few instances of specific cases of this kind which both consider in parallel. But latest
TimeWamer/EMI merger, but the deal collapsed before a decision. [would have reduced 5 to 4].

